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050-v66-SERCMS02 RSA Certificate Management(R) Solution 6.6 CSE

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050-v66-SERCMS02 exam Dumps Source : RSA Certificate Management(R) Solution 6.6 CSE

Test Code : 050-v66-SERCMS02
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Vendor appellation : RSA
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RSA RSA Certificate Management(R) Solution

SSH Tectia certified With RSA Secured confederate software | killexams.com true Questions and Pass4sure dumps

WELLESLEY, Mass. and HELSINKI, Finland, Sept. 15 /PRNewswire/ -- SSH Communications protection Corp. (OMX: SSH1V), an international-leading issuer of enterprise safety options and conclusion-to-end communications security, and the original developer of the relaxed Shell protocol, today announced it has joined the RSA Secured(R) associate program and carried out certified interoperability between its SSH Tectia client/Server and SSH Tectia ConnectSecure(TM) and RSA SecurID(R) and RSA(R) certificate manager options from RSA, The protection Division of EMC (NYSE: EMC). SSH Communications protection believes that its enterprise shoppers will improvement from this interoperability partnership through more desirable information security, reduced deployment time and lessen middling can saturate of ownership.

together, SSH Tectia and RSA SecurID assist to give protection to mission-vital file transfers and information-in-transit with two-factor authentication for comfy access ply and a extra trustworthy chain of custody. RSA certificate manager is engineered to give a scalable gear that automates and centralizes the management of cryptographic keys and digital certificates.

"it is greater censorious than ever for organizations to enhance the protection and integrity of their advantageous assistance. in an effort to support their joint shoppers greater give protection to their guidance, they are joyful to subsist working with SSH Communications security to achieve interoperability between RSA expertise and SSH Tectia client/Server and SSH Tectia ConnectSecure," mentioned D.J. lengthy, senior director, corporate evolution at RSA. "Our agencies are dedicated to assist mitigate desultory to choice information utter the way through its lifecycle to invent certain that it's utter the time an asset, and never a liability, and makes it viable for businesses to speed up their commerce targets."

SSH Tectia customer/Server is the de facto common commerce protection respond used via thousands and thousands global for cozy file transfers, gadget administration and software connectivity utter over the network. SSH Tectia provides transparent, robust encryption, bendy authentication alternate options, direct assist for utter essential trade systems, and sophisticated efficiency, with out requiring changes to the present infrastructure or functions. It additionally helps companies meet regulatory compliance requirements, including the Federal assistance Processing standards (FIPS) a hundred and forty-2 certified cryptographic algorithm for Use in U.S. federal executive functions. moreover, the commercially supported SSH Tectia solution with SSH Tectia manager helps businesses achieve compliance with PCI DSS and other govt regulatory necessities.

The award-winning SSH Tectia ConnectSecure allows companies to promptly and price-without problems at ease any File switch Protocol (FTP) file transfer and information-in-transit without any change to the present infrastructure, scripts or functions, and is suitable with any industrial SSH or OpenSSH ambiance.

The SSH Tectia answer, which comprises SSH Tectia customer, Server, manager, ConnectSecure, and Server for IBM z/OS, allows organizations to implement high- performance at ease file transfers, restful software connectivity and relaxed gear administration utter the way through heterogeneous networks. SSH Tectia ConnectSecure provides revolutionary features, including computerized FTP-to-SFTP (comfy File transfer Protocol) conversion, lucid FTP, and TCP/IP software tunneling to instantly substitute unsecure protocols with comfy ones. SSH Tectia ConnectSecure greatly increases the variety of organisations, fiscal associations, foremost marketers, and govt companies that may leverage its cost-saving advantages.

"most of the world's biggest companies and government agencies believe near to depend on SSH Tectia to at ease even their most choice commerce and buyer information," talked about George Adams, CEO, SSH Communications safety, Inc. "by means of proposing interoperability with leading digital certificates administration and authentication solutions, we're offering joint valued clientele an unmatched stage of statistics safety and an extra layer of effectual insurance routine for key corporate assets."

About RSA SecurID

The RSA SecurID system is as primary to Use as coming into a password, but enormously greater comfortable. Used in conjunction with RSA(R) Authentication supervisor software, an RSA SecurID authenticator services devotion an automated Teller laptop (ATM) card for an organization community, requiring clients to determine themselves with two entertaining factors -- something they understand (a password or PIN), and some thing they believe (similar to an RSA SecurID key fob token) - earlier than they are granted entry to secure company assistance.

About RSA certificates manager

RSA certificates supervisor is an business-main module-based solution for managing digital certificates and growing an environment for authenticated, inner most and legally binding electronic communications and transactions. RSA certificates supervisor is engineered to invent the deployment of digital certificates more convenient and more cost-efficient than aggressive choices. It presents credential lifecycle management, tall availability and scalability, and adaptive deployment capabilities.

About SSH Tectia

SSH Tectia is the main end-to-conclusion communications safety respond for the enterprise. The SSH Tectia solution is in line with the SSH restful Shell and SSH's other industry-leading technologies used by way of millions international. SSH Tectia permits secure file transfer, comfy gadget administration, and relaxed software connectivity with centralized management prerogative through inside and external networks. SSH Tectia items supply transparent, powerful encryption and authentication, and can subsist establish for utter key enterprise systems together with home windows, Unix, Linux, and mainframes to quite simply combine into heterogeneous community environments.

in regards to the RSA Secured companion program

The RSA Secured associate program is likely one of the biggest alliance courses of its category, bringing over a dozen years of sustain and hundreds of complementary solutions together. RSA SecurID(R), RSA(R) access supervisor, RSA(R) certificates manager and RSA(R) Federated identification supervisor certification courses carry added assurance to purchasers that the options they're deploying are licensed as interoperable with trade leading products, helping them obtain faster time to deployment and lessen overall cost of ownership. The RSA Secured accomplice software reflects RSA's dedication to offering standards-based mostly interoperability and mutual seller aid to valued clientele using its identification assurance and entry management options. For extra advice, please visit www.rsa.com/rsasecured.

About SSH Communications safety

SSH Communications security is a world-main company of commerce safety options and end-to-conclusion communications protection, and the customary developer of the cozy Shell protocol. The business's SSH Tectia solution addresses the most crucial needs of huge firms, economic institutions, and executive businesses. With SSH Tectia, businesses can can charge-without difficulty relaxed their system administration, file transfers, and software connectivity against both interior and external security hazards. because the customary developer of the cozy Shell protocol and different key network security applied sciences, SSH has since 1995 developed conclusion-to-conclusion communications protection solutions especially for the business. currently more than one hundred of global Fortune 500 agencies are the Use of SSH protection solutions. SSH shares are quoted on the Helsinki Exchanges main listing. For more assistance, please debate with www.ssh.com.

SSH Corp. Americas Regional Asia Pacific Regional Contact: Contact: Contact: George Adams Byron Rashed Shiho Hashimoto SSH Corp. SSH Inc. SSH Corp. +1 781 247 2100 +1 949 643 0733 +358 20 500 7470 george.adams@ssh.com byron.rashed@ssh.com shiho.hashimoto@ssh.com Europe Regional Americas agency Investor members of the family Contact: Contact: Contact: Bo Sorensen Cheryl Seaberg Mika Peuranen SSH Corp. Walt & enterprise SSH Corp. +358 20 500 7404 +1 408 369 7200 x2981 +358 20 500 7419 bo.sorensen@ssh.com ssh@walt.com mika.peuranen@ssh.com

(C) 2008 SSH Communications safety Corp. utter rights reserved. ssh(R) and Tectia(R) are registered emblems of SSH Communications security Corp in the united states and in certain different jurisdictions. The SSH and Tectia trademarks are trademarks of SSH Communications security Corp and may subsist registered in certain jurisdictions.

RSA, Secured and SecurID are registered logos or emblems of RSA security Inc. in the U.S. and/or other international locations. EMC is a registered trademark of EMC company. utter different names and marks are the property of their respective homeowners.

supply SSH Communications security Corp.


Zenprise Achieves Secured by way of RSA licensed(R) status With RSA Digital certificates options to give PKI certificate Integration | killexams.com true Questions and Pass4sure dumps

REDWOOD city, CA--(Marketwire -08/22/12)- Zenprise®, Inc., the chief in secure mobile gadget management (MDM) innovation, today announced that it has joined the Secured by RSA® licensed confederate application and has centered interoperability between Zenprise MobileManager™ and RSA® Digital certificates options from RSA, The security Division of EMC (EMC). This certification implies that an interoperability partnership has been conditional which is designed to present accelerated cell security for customers. This interoperability comes after RSA certification checking out of Zenprise's MobileManager solution and reinforces Zenprise's dedication to offering shoppers with the highest diploma of security viable.

The interoperability between Zenprise MobileManager and RSA Digital certificates options is designed to enable consumers to embrace the BYOD cellular fashion devoid of compromising security. The interoperable respond leverages the Zenprise common PKI interface to generate device id and user authentication certificates as the groundwork for comfy mutual authentication or to appoint access to corporate elements.

"we're cheerful to welcome Zenprise into the Secured by using RSA licensed confederate application. As enterprises work to optimize their cell business, the want for trusted and confirmed safety solutions is a priority," observed David Low, director, Strategic technology Alliances, RSA. "Interoperability of RSA and Zenprise items will assist purchasers bring a cell respond that's each greater relaxed and effortless for the conclusion user."

whether delivered as an on-premise server or cloud solution, Zenprise MobileManager allows IT to control the device lifecycle across every major platform, including iPhone®, iPad®, Android™, BlackBerry®, Symbian® and home windows cell. Zenprise MobileManager gives IT with the ply and visibility essential to proactively control and secure cell contraptions, functions, statistics and the corporate network, whereas empowering mobile employees to subsist productive from virtually anywhere at any time. not devotion different solutions at the jiffy purchasable, Zenprise MobileManager elements commercial enterprise-grade structure with scalability and high-availability assist throughout.

"Zenprise's reputation as one of the first MDM businesses to obtain Secured by means of RSA licensed accomplice repute helps validate Zenprise as one of the crucial comfy MDM respond suppliers in this abruptly evolving house," observed Dr. Waheed Qureshi, founder and chief expertise officer, Zenprise. "Our interoperability partnership with RSA continues to parade their commitment to security innovation. Zenprise mobile supervisor's interoperability with RSA Digital certificate options will support firms invent certain they are working in an environment that is comfortable, effortless to invent Use of and mercurial to set up."

concerning the Secured through RSA certified accomplice program The Secured by RSA certified associate application is among the greatest and longest-operating expertise alliance courses of its classification, bringing over 1,000 complementary solutions across greater than 300 companies together. RSA SecurID®, RSA® entry supervisor, RSA® Adaptive Authentication, RSA® Digital certificate options, RSA® facts Loss Prevention (DLP) Suite, RSA® Hybrid Authenticators, RSA® enVision, RSA® Federated id manager and RSA® data coverage supervisor Suite certification courses carry brought assurance to shoppers that their solutions are licensed as interoperable to aid them achieve sooner time to deployment and lessen middling cost of possession. The Secured by means of RSA licensed companion application reflects RSA's dedication to driving inventive collaboration throughout the industry and assist requisites-based interoperability with its tips-centric protection options to assist present protection to information, identities and infrastructures. For greater tips, please consult with http://www.securedbyrsa.com.

About RSA Digital certificate SolutionsRSA Digital certificates solutions are interoperable modules designed to control digital certificates and create an environment for authenticated, inner most and legally binding electronic communications and transactions. Independently validated to scale to greater than eight million users per server, RSA Digital certificates options are developed upon open necessities, duty interoperability with greater than 200 functions: concern, control and validate digital certificates, streamline the enrollment procedure for managing significant volumes of conclusion-person certificate requests; allow immediate validation of digital certificates; securely archive and obtain better encryption keys of users; and enable corporations to "chain" their certificate authority to RSA's relied on root.

Story Continues

About ZenpriseHeadquartered in Silicon Valley, Zenprise is the leader in comfy cell gadget administration. handiest Zenprise protects utter layers of the cell enterprise, preserving organizations at ease and compliant. Zenprise MobileManager™ and Zencloud™ let IT disclose "sure" to cell gear option while safeguarding choice company information, protective the network from mobile threats, and retaining compliance with regulatory and company policies. This offers IT peace of intellect, lets executives elevate their agencies cellular, and makes personnel productive whereas on the go.

Zenprise's huge list of global customers and companions spans a move-section of international locations and vertical industries together with: aerospace and protection, economic services, healthcare, oil and gasoline, prison, telecommunications, retail, leisure, and federal, state and local governments.

For greater assistance about Zenprise, please consult with www.zenprise.com or solemnize us on the Zenprise blog (http://www.zenprise.com/blog), fb (http://www.fb.com/zenprise) and Twitter (@zenprise_inc).

© 2012 Zenprise, Inc. utter rights reserved. Zenprise is a registered trademark, and Zenprise MobileManager and Zencloud are trademarks of Zenprise Inc. RSA, EMC, Secured and SecurID are both registered emblems or trademarks of EMC service provider in the u.s. and/or other nations. utter third-party emblems, trade names, or service marks could subsist claimed as the property of their respective homeowners.


TUV Rheinland OpenSky Releases Entitlements overview respond for the RSA Archer exchange™ | killexams.com true Questions and Pass4sure dumps

October 02, 2018 --

the area�s premier company for IT, cybersecurity and GRC advisory functions adds entitlement review app to aid agencies control IT chance.

COLOGNE, Germany and LITTLETON, Mass., Oct. 02, 2018 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- TUV Rheinland OpenSky, a unconditionally owned subsidiary of T�V Rheinland, nowadays announced that its world studying possibility and Compliance focus of Excellence has launched its first providing in a sequence of Digital desultory administration options that it is going to provide for the RSA exchange. the unusual providing is a person Entitlement review app-pack that provides a technique to prioritize and overview users and their entitlements throughout many forms of belongings used within the commercial enterprise.

The TUV Rheinland OpenSky person Entitlement overview app-pack offers an conclusion-to-end routine for reviewing entitlements and gaining visibility for entitlement possibility stages. �we're excited to believe the brand unusual TUV Rheinland OpenSky providing as a share of the RSA exchange.�Their addition to the RSA alternate is a major illustration of the power of the RSA accomplice ecosystem in presenting their valued clientele with a wide array of integrated possibility management solutions in response to nowadays�s advanced and rapidly changing commerce necessities,� referred to Susan read-Miller, software manager, RSA exchange.

Key points of the respond consist of the potential to:

  • tune entry for inside and out of doors users throughout the enterprise
  • document consumer entitlement tips
  • Periodically evaluate entitlements for accuracy and alterations
  • Prioritize stories to complete the extra crucial or Dangerous entitlements first
  • manipulate entitlement review findings and remediation
  • �we are excited to develop into a share of the RSA alternate for RSA Archer and to subsist capable of share imaginative solutions from their global middle of Excellence,� said notice Coderre, world ensue Director, Digital Transformation and Cybersecurity T�V Rheinland. �Our unusual respond concentrated on capabilities for Entitlements review is the primary in a series of app-packs and we�re anticipating their next choices on the way to allow maturity in Digital possibility management.�

    The RSA Archer Suite is designed to assist agencies elevate command of the distinctive dimensions of built-in possibility administration, with options developed on commerce requirements and most efficient practices on one configurable and built-in application platform. TUV Rheinland OpenSky has centered itself among the world�s premier counsel technology, cybersecurity, and GRC advisory provider suppliers. helping shoppers throughout the USA, UK, Germany, Austria and Switzerland, TUV Rheinland OpenSky holds a strong RSA Archer solemnize and start methodology, imposing options effectively considering 2010.

    To gain knowledge of more about TUV Rheinland OpenSky�s Entitlements evaluate respond for the RSA exchange, talk over with https://group.rsa.com/doctors/DOC-95941.

    �2018 Dell Inc. or its subsidiaries. utter rights reserved. RSA and the RSA logo, are registered trademarks or emblems of Dell Inc. or its subsidiaries in the united states and different international locations. utter other trademarks are the property of their respective owners.

    About TUV Rheinland OpenSkyTUV Rheinland OpenSky presents one of the most superior and integrated portfolios of safety options and capabilities for linked gadgets, platforms and cyber web of things (IoT) with the mission to permit a comfy and protected digital future. They provide advisory, consulting, techniques integration, checking out, certification and managed safety functions for connected platforms in three core disciplines: superior Cyber defense, mastering desultory and Compliance, and relaxed Cloud Enablement. Their consultants support consumers protect counsel belongings, lower risk and speed up the adoption of enabling technologies with the aid of taking a holistic possibility-primarily based approach that addresses Cybersecurity, privateness, Cloud Infrastructure and purposeful defense requirements to construct relied on, related systems.

    With headquarters in Littleton, MA, TUV Rheinland OpenSky is a subsidiary of T�V Rheinland group, which operates probably the most world�s broadest smart machine and IoT checking out labs, defining trade necessities for purposeful security and protection, and a number one provider of inspection and assurance services that amalgamate safeguard, fine and security certifications.

    For more suggestions on TUV Rheinland OpenSky, please talk over with�www.tuvopensky.com.

    About T�V RheinlandT�V Rheinland is a global leader in impartial inspection services, founded one hundred forty five years in the past. The community keeps a global presence of more than 20,000 people; annual turnover is just about EUR 2 billion. The independent specialists stand for attribute and safeguard for americans, technology and the ambiance in very nearly utter features of life. T�V Rheinland inspects technical gadget, items and capabilities, oversees initiatives, and helps to shape strategies and counsel security for groups. Its experts instruct people in a wide array of careers and industries. To this conclusion, T�V Rheinland employs a worldwide community of authorized labs, checking out and education centers. due to the fact 2006, T�V Rheinland has been a member of the United international locations global Compact to advertise sustainability and fight corruption. website: www.tuv.com

    CONTACT: Contact suggestions:Jen PicardoDirector of CommunicationsTUV Rheinland of North the usa, [email protected] BahrScratch marketing + [email protected] linked keyword phrases:

    source:Copyright (c) GlobeNewswire, Inc. utter Rights Reserved


    050-v66-SERCMS02 RSA Certificate Management(R) Solution 6.6 CSE

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    050-v66-SERCMS02 exam Dumps Source : RSA Certificate Management(R) Solution 6.6 CSE

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    Test appellation : RSA Certificate Management(R) Solution 6.6 CSE
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    Cisco, Researchers Develop unusual Security Techniques to Thwart Quantum Attacks | killexams.com true questions and Pass4sure dumps

    Cisco Systems Inc. is working with researchers to develop unusual cryptographic algorithms that could assist enterprises protect expense report systems, human resources platforms, internal communications and other applications against a potential assault by a quantum computer.

    Cisco is partnering with Isara Corp., a Canadian startup founded by former BlackBerry Ltd. security executives on the initiative, as the nascent quantum computing industry gains traction and technology companies invent more headway in the race to build the world’s first scalable, universal purpose quantum computer.

    “We don’t know if quantum computers are going to exist within four years or 10 years, but we’re seeing a lot of research taking space in this space, and they want to subsist prepared,” said Panos Kampanakis, technical marketing engineer at Cisco.

    Cisco is among several companies and organizations working to develop unusual security systems capable of thwarting a quantum computing assault on internet security by hackers or rogue nation states.

    By harnessing the properties of quantum physics, quantum computers believe the potential to sort through a vast number of possibilities within a fraction of a second to near up with a probable solution. While traditional computers Use binary digits, or bits, which can either subsist 0s or 1s, quantum computers Use quantum bits, or qubits, which can portray and store information in both 0s and 1s simultaneously.

    A widely used encryption algorithm called RSA is among those particularly at risk when a large-scale quantum computer does near to market.

    Cisco has been researching unusual types of algorithms that could protect against a quantum computing assault for about five years, Mr. Kampanakis said. “We’re trying to elevate the next step and interpolate these algorithms into real-world protocols now, in order to invent them usable,” he said. “We don’t want to wait 15 years. They want to subsist prepared and subsist ready for when that time comes.”

    In partnership with Isara, Cisco is developing a way for a single digital certificate to accommodate multiple algorithms that could thwart against attacks by both classical computers and quantum computers.

    Digital certificates act as a user or entity’s digital identity. They’re used to authenticate a user when they’re making an online purchase or logging into a human resources system at work, for example, said Michael Brown, chief technology officer at Isara.

    A user can descry whether a particular website is trustworthy, for example, by clicking on the green lock icon in a web browser.

    Today, digital certificates believe cryptographic keys based on traditional security algorithms such as RSA.

    The RSA algorithm is particularly vulnerable when a powerful quantum computer comes to market because it’s based on integer factorization, which is essentially invert multiplication.

    It would elevate classical computers, even supercomputers, several years to quickly factor big numbers that are 500 or 600 digits long, which means solving for integer factorization is impractical and inefficient, experts believe said previously. Quantum computers, though, are capable of solving integer factorization problems perhaps trillions of times faster than a classical computer.

    Cisco is introducing digital certificates with cryptographic keys based on those algorithms in addition to so-called quantum resistant algorithms that could potentially thwart against a quantum computing attack.

    The company made the unusual certificates available for companies and researchers to test this week. Any large-scale information technology upgrade will elevate years of planning to reduce the costs, complexity and potential burdens on user experience, so it’s vital for companies to start testing and demanding standardized algorithms now, Mr. Brown said.

    “The reality is that this is going to involve updating utter information and communications technology systems to subsist ‘quantum safe,’” he said.


    Kerberos V5 System Administrator's lead | killexams.com true questions and Pass4sure dumps

    Kerberos V5 System Administrator's Guide Copyright

    Copyright © 1985-2007 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

    Export of software employing encryption from the United States of America may require a specific license from the United States Government. It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to obtain such a license before exporting.

    WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, license to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright notice materialize in utter copies and that both that copyright notice and this license notice materialize in supporting documentation, and that the appellation of M.I.T. not subsist used in advertising or publicity pertaining to distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission. Furthermore if you modify this software you must label your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a fashion that it might subsist confused with the original MIT software. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of this software for any purpose. It is provided “as is” without express or implied warranty.

    Individual source code files are copyright MIT, Cygnus Support, Novell, OpenVision Technologies, Oracle, Red Hat, Sun Microsystems, FundsXpress, and others.

    Project Athena, Athena, Athena MUSE, Discuss, Hesiod, Kerberos, Moira, and Zephyr are trademarks of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). No commercial Use of these trademarks may subsist made without prior written license of MIT.

    “Commercial use” means Use of a appellation in a product or other for-profit manner. It does NOT preclude a commercial difficult from referring to the MIT trademarks in order to convey information (although in doing so, recognition of their trademark status should subsist given).

    The following copyright and license notice applies to the OpenVision Kerberos Administration system located in kadmin/create, kadmin/dbutil, kadmin/passwd, kadmin/server, lib/kadm5, and portions of lib/rpc:

    Copyright, OpenVision Technologies, Inc., 1996, utter Rights Reserved

    WARNING: Retrieving the OpenVision Kerberos Administration system source code, as described below, indicates your acceptance of the following terms. If you effect not accord to the following terms, effect not retrieve the OpenVision Kerberos administration system.

    You may freely Use and distribute the Source Code and protest Code compiled from it, with or without modification, but this Source Code is provided to you “AS IS” EXCLUSIVE OF ANY WARRANTY, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR ANY OTHER WARRANTY, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. IN NO EVENT WILL OPENVISION believe ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY LOST PROFITS, LOSS OF DATA OR COSTS OF PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES, OR FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THOSE RESULTING FROM THE Use OF THE SOURCE CODE, OR THE FAILURE OF THE SOURCE CODE TO PERFORM, OR FOR ANY OTHER REASON.

    OpenVision retains utter copyrights in the donated Source Code. OpenVision furthermore retains copyright to derivative works of the Source Code, whether created by OpenVision or by a third party. The OpenVision copyright notice must subsist preserved if derivative works are made based on the donated Source Code.

    OpenVision Technologies, Inc. has donated this Kerberos Administration system to MIT for inclusion in the standard Kerberos 5 distribution. This donation underscores their commitment to continuing Kerberos technology evolution and their gratitude for the valuable work which has been performed by MIT and the Kerberos community.

    Portions contributed by Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov> were work performed at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, which is operated by Universities Research Association, Inc., under contract DE-AC02-76CHO3000 with the U.S. Department of Energy.

    Portions of src/lib/crypto believe the following copyright:

    Copyright © 1998 by the FundsXpress, INC.

    All rights reserved.

    Export of this software from the United States of America may require a specific license from the United States Government. It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to obtain such a license before exporting.

    WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, license to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright notice materialize in utter copies and that both that copyright notice and this license notice materialize in supporting documentation, and that the appellation of FundsXpress. not subsist used in advertising or publicity pertaining to distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission. FundsXpress makes no representations about the suitability of this software for any purpose. It is provided “as is” without express or implied warranty.

    THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED “AS IS” AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

    The implementation of the Yarrow pseudo-random number generator in src/lib/crypto/yarrow has the following copyright:

    Copyright 2000 by Zero-Knowledge Systems, Inc.

    Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software and its documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee, provided that the above copyright notice materialize in utter copies and that both that copyright notice and this license notice materialize in supporting documentation, and that the appellation of Zero-Knowledge Systems, Inc. not subsist used in advertising or publicity pertaining to distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission. Zero-Knowledge Systems, Inc. makes no representations about the suitability of this software for any purpose. It is provided “as is” without express or implied warranty.

    ZERO-KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS, INC. DISCLAIMS utter WARRANTIES WITH admiration TO THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING utter IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL ZERO-KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS, INC. subsist LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, indirect OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTUOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE Use OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.

    The implementation of the AES encryption algorithm in src/lib/crypto/aes has the following copyright:

    Copyright © 2001, Dr Brian Gladman <brg@gladman.uk.net>, Worcester, UK.All rights reserved.

    LICENSE TERMS

    The free distribution and Use of this software in both source and binary configuration is allowed (with or without changes) provided that:

  • distributions of this source code comprehend the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer;
  • distributions in binary configuration comprehend the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other associated materials;
  • the copyright holder's appellation is not used to endorse products built using this software without specific written permission.
  • DISCLAIMER

    This software is provided 'as is' with no explcit or implied warranties in respect of any properties, including, but not limited to, correctness and fitness for purpose.

    Portions contributed by Red Hat, including the pre-authentication plug-in framework, hold the following copyright:

    Copyright © 2006 Red Hat, Inc.Portions copyright © 2006 Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyAll Rights Reserved.

    Redistribution and Use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:

  • Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  • Redistributions in binary configuration must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  • Neither the appellation of Red Hat, Inc., nor the names of its contributors may subsist used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
  • THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS “AS IS” AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS subsist LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR commerce INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE Use OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

    The implementations of GSSAPI mechglue in GSSAPI-SPNEGO in src/lib/gssapi, including the following files:

    lib/gssapi/generic/gssapi_err_generic.et lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_accept_sec_context.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_acquire_cred.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_canon_name.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_compare_name.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_context_time.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_delete_sec_context.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_dsp_name.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_dsp_status.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_dup_name.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_exp_sec_context.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_export_name.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_glue.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_imp_name.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_imp_sec_context.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_init_sec_context.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_initialize.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inquire_context.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inquire_cred.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inquire_names.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_process_context.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_rel_buffer.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_rel_cred.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_rel_name.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_rel_oid_set.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_seal.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_sign.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_store_cred.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unseal.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_userok.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_utils.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_verify.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/gssd_pname_to_uid.c lib/gssapi/mechglue/mglueP.h lib/gssapi/mechglue/oid_ops.c lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c

    are subject to the following license:

    Copyright © 2004 Sun Microsystems, Inc.

    Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the “Software”), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to effect so, subject to the following conditions:

    The above copyright notice and this license notice shall subsist included in utter copies or substantial portions of the Software.

    THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED “AS IS”, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS subsist LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE Use OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.

    Kerberos V5 includes documentation and software developed at the University of California at Berkeley, which includes this copyright notice:

    Copyright © 1983 Regents of the University of California.All rights reserved.

    Redistribution and Use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:

  • Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  • Redistributions in binary configuration must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  • Neither the appellation of the University nor the names of its contributors may subsist used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
  • THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS “AS IS” AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS subsist LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR commerce INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE Use OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

    Portions contributed by Novell, Inc., including the LDAP database backend, are subject to the following license:

    Copyright (c) 2004-2005, Novell, Inc. utter rights reserved.

    Redistribution and Use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:

  • Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  • Redistributions in binary configuration must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  • The copyright holder's appellation is not used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
  • THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS “AS IS” AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS subsist LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR commerce INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE Use OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

    Portions funded by Sandia National Laboratory and developed by the University of Michigan's focus for Information Technology Integration, including the PKINIT implementation, are subject to the following license:

    COPYRIGHT © 2006-2007THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGANALL RIGHTS RESERVED

    Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works and redistribute this software and such derivative works for any purpose, so long as the appellation of The University of Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity pertaining to the Use of distribution of this software without specific, written prior authorization. If the above copyright notice or any other identification of the University of Michigan is included in any copy of any portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must furthermore subsist included.

    THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT subsist LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY title ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE Use OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.

    The pkcs11.h file included in the PKINIT code has the following license:

    Copyright 2006 g10 Code GmbH Copyright 2006 Andreas Jellinghaus

    This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives unlimited license to copy and/or distribute it, with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.

    This file is distributed in the hope that it will subsist useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

    Permission is granted to invent and distribute verbatim copies of this manual provided the copyright notices and this license notice are preserved on utter copies.

    Permission is granted to copy and distribute modified versions of this manual under the conditions for verbatim copying, provided furthermore that the entire resulting derived work is distributed under the terms of a license notice identical to this one.

    Permission is granted to copy and distribute translations of this manual into another language, under the above conditions for modified versions.

    1 Introduction 1.1 Why Should I Use Kerberos?

    Since Kerberos negotiates authenticated, and optionally encrypted, communications between two points anywhere on the internet, it provides a layer of security that is not conditional on which side of a firewall either client is on. Since studies believe shown that half of the computer security breaches in industry chance from inside firewalls, Kerberos V5 from MIT will play a vital role in the security of your network.

    1.2 Documentation for Kerberos V5

    This document is one piece of the document set for Kerberos V5. The documents, and their intended audiences, are:

  • Kerberos V5 Installation Guide: a concise lead for installing Kerberos V5. Kerberos administrators (particularly whoever will subsist making site-wide decisions about the installation) and the system administrators who will subsist installing the software should read this guide.
  • Kerberos V5 System Administrator's Guide: a sysadmin's lead to administering a Kerberos installation. The System Administrator's lead describes the administration software and suggests policies and procedures for administering a Kerberos installation. Anyone who will believe administrative access to your Kerberos database should read this guide.
  • Kerberos V5 UNIX User's Guide: a lead to using the Kerberos UNIX client programs. utter users on UNIX systems should read this guide, particularly the “Tutorial” section.
  • 1.3 Overview of This Guide

    The next chapter describes how Kerberos works.

    Chapter three describes administration of the principals in the Kerberos database.

    Chapter four describes how you can Use DNS in configuring your Kerberos realm.

    Chapter five describes administrative programs for manipulating the Kerberos database as a whole.

    Chapter six describes OpenLDAP Configuration steps.

    Chapter seven describes issues to consider when adding an application server to the database.

    Chapter eight describes their problem reporting system.

    The appendices comprehend the list of Kerberos oversight messages, and a complete list of the time zones understood by kadmin.

    2 How Kerberos Works

    This section provides a simplified description of a universal user's interaction with the Kerberos system. This interaction happens transparently—users don't necessity to know and probably don't saturate about what's going on—but Kerberos administrators might find a schematic description of the process useful. This description glosses over a lot of details; for more information, descry Kerberos: An Authentication Service for Open Network Systems, a paper presented at Winter USENIX 1988, in Dallas, Texas. This paper can subsist retreived by FTP from athena-dist.mit.edu, in the location: /pub/ATHENA/kerberos/doc/usenix.PS.

    2.1 Network Services and Their Client Programs

    In an environment that provides network services, you Use client programs to request services from server programs that are somewhere on the network. Suppose you believe logged in to a workstation and you want to rlogin to a typical UNIX host. You Use the local rlogin client program to contact the remote machine's rlogind daemon.

    2.2 Kerberos Tickets

    Under Kerberos, the klogind daemon allows you to login to a remote machine if you can provide klogind a Kerberos ticket which proves your identity. In addition to the ticket, you must furthermore believe possession of the corresponding ticket session key. The combination of a ticket and the ticket's session key is known as a credential.

    Typically, a client program automatically obtains credentials identifying the person using the client program. The credentials are obtained from a Kerberos server that resides somewhere on the network. A Kerberos server maintains a database of user, server, and password information.

    2.3 The Kerberos Database

    Kerberos will give you credentials only if you believe an entry in the Kerberos server's Kerberos database. Your database entry includes your Kerberos principal (an identifying string, which is often just your username), and your Kerberos password. Every Kerberos user must believe an entry in this database.

    2.4 Kerberos Realms

    Each administrative domain will believe its own Kerberos database, which contains information about the users and services for that particular site or administrative domain. This administrative domain is the Kerberos realm.

    Each Kerberos realm will believe at least one Kerberos server, where the master Kerberos database for that site or administrative domain is stored. A Kerberos realm may furthermore believe one or more slave servers, which believe read-only copies of the Kerberos database that are periodically propagated from the master server. For more details on how this is done, descry the “Set Up the Slave KDCs for Database Propagation” and “Propagate the Database to Each Slave KDC” sections of the Kerberos V5 Installation Guide.

    2.5 The Ticket-Granting Ticket

    The kinit command prompts for your password. If you enter it successfully, you will obtain a ticket-granting ticket and a ticket session key which gives you the prerogative to Use the ticket. This combination of the ticket and its associated key is known as your credentials. As illustrated below, client programs Use your ticket-granting ticket credentials in order to obtain client-specific credentials as needed.

    Your credentials are stored in a credentials cache, which is often just a file in /tmp. The credentials cache is furthermore called the ticket file, especially in Kerberos V4 documentation. Note, however, that a credentials cache does not believe to subsist stored in a file.

    2.6 Network Services and the Master Database

    The master database furthermore contains entries for utter network services that require Kerberos authentication. Suppose that your site has a machine, laughter.mit.edu, that requires Kerberos authentication from anyone who wants to rlogin to it. The host's Kerberos realm is ATHENA.MIT.EDU.

    This service must subsist registered in the Kerberos database, using the proper service name, which in this case is the principal:

    host/laughter.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU

    The / character separates the Kerberos primary (in this case, host) from the instance (in this case, laughter.mit.edu); the @ character separates the realm appellation (in this case, ATHENA.MIT.EDU) from the comfort of the principal. The primary, host, denotes the appellation or type of the service that is being offered: generic host-level access to the machine. The instance, laughter.mit.edu, names the specific machine that is offering this service. There will generally subsist many different machines, each offering one particular type of service, and the instance serves to give each one of these servers a different Kerberos principal.

    2.6.1 The Keytab File

    For each service, there must furthermore subsist a service key known only by Kerberos and the service. On the Kerberos server, the service key is stored in the Kerberos database.

    On the server host, these service keys are stored in key tables, which are files known as keytabs.1 For example, the service keys used by services that elope as root are usually stored in the keytab file /etc/krb5.keytab. N.B.: This service key is the equivalent of the service's password, and must subsist kept secure. Data which is meant to subsist read only by the service is encrypted using this key.

    2.7 The User/Kerberos Interaction

    Suppose that you walk up to a host intending to login to it, and then rlogin to the machine laughter. Here's what happens:

  • You login to the workstation and Use the kinit command to obtain a ticket-granting ticket. This command prompts you for your Kerberos password. (On systems running the Kerberos V5 login program, this may subsist done as share of the login process, not requiring the user to elope a separate program.)
  • The kinit command sends your request to the Kerberos master server machine. The server software looks for your principal name's entry in the Kerberos database.
  • If this entry exists, the Kerberos server creates and returns a ticket-granting ticket and the key which allows you to Use it, encrypted by your password. If kinit can decrypt the Kerberos reply using the password you provide, it stores this ticket in a credentials cache on your local machine for later use. The appellation of the credentials cache can subsist specified in the KRB5CCNAME environment variable. If this variable is not set, the appellation of the file will subsist /tmp/krb5cc_<uid>, where <uid> is your UNIX user-id, represented in decimal format.
  • Now you Use the rlogin client to access the machine laughter. host% rlogin laughter
  • The rlogin client checks your ticket file to descry if you believe a ticket for the host service for laughter. You don't, so rlogin uses the credential cache's ticket-granting ticket to invent a request to the master server's ticket-granting service.
  • This ticket-granting service receives the request for a ticket for host/laughter.mit.edu, and looks in the master database for an entry for host/laughter.mit.edu. If the entry exists, the ticket-granting service issues you a ticket for that service. That ticket is furthermore cached in your credentials cache.
  • The rlogin client now sends that ticket to the laughter klogind service program. The service program checks the ticket by using its own service key. If the ticket is valid, it now knows your identity. If you are allowed to login to laughter (because your username matches one in /etc/passwd, or your Kerberos principal is in the preempt .k5login file), klogind will let you login.
  • 2.8 Definitions

    Following are definitions of some of the Kerberos terminology.

    client an entity that can obtain a ticket. This entity is usually either a user or a host. host a computer that can subsist accessed over a network. Kerberos in Greek mythology, the three-headed dog that guards the entrance to the underworld. In the computing world, Kerberos is a network security package that was developed at MIT. KDC Key Distribution Center. A machine that issues Kerberos tickets. keytab a key table file containing one or more keys. A host or service uses a keytab file in much the same way as a user uses his/her password. principal a string that names a specific entity to which a set of credentials may subsist assigned. It can believe an capricious number of components, but generally has three: primary the first share of a Kerberos principal. In the case of a user, it is the username. In the case of a service, it is the appellation of the service. instance the second share of a Kerberos principal. It gives information that qualifies the primary. The instance may subsist null. In the case of a user, the instance is often used to narrate the intended Use of the corresponding credentials. In the case of a host, the instance is the fully qualified hostname. realm the analytic network served by a single Kerberos database and a set of Key Distribution Centers. By convention, realm names are generally utter uppercase letters, to differentiate the realm from the internet domain.

    The typical format of a typical Kerberos principal is primary/instance@REALM.

    service any program or computer you access over a network. Examples of services comprehend “host” (a host, e.g., when you Use telnet and rsh), “ftp” (FTP), “krbtgt” (authentication; cf. ticket-granting ticket), and “pop” (email). ticket a temporary set of electronic credentials that verify the identity of a client for a particular service. TGT Ticket-Granting Ticket. A special Kerberos ticket that permits the client to obtain additional Kerberos tickets within the same Kerberos realm. 3 Configuration Files 3.1 Supported Encryption Types

    Any tag in the configuration files which requires a list of encryption types can subsist set to some combination of the following strings.

    des-cbc-crc DES cbc mode with CRC-32 des-cbc-md4 DES cbc mode with RSA-MD4 des-cbc-md5 DES cbc mode with RSA-MD5 des3-cbc-sha1 des3-hmac-sha1 des3-cbc-sha1-kd triple DES cbc mode with HMAC/sha1 des-hmac-sha1 DES with HMAC/sha1 aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 aes256-cts AES-256 CTS mode with 96-bit SHA-1 HMAC aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 aes128-cts AES-128 CTS mode with 96-bit SHA-1 HMAC arcfour-hmac rc4-hmac arcfour-hmac-md5 RC4 with HMAC/MD5 arcfour-hmac-exp rc4-hmac-exp arcfour-hmac-md5-exp exportable RC4 with HMAC/MD5

    While aes128-cts and aes256-cts are supported for utter Kerberos operations, they are not supported by older versions of their GSSAPI implementation (krb5-1.3.1 and earlier).

    By default, AES is enabled in this release. Sites wishing to Use AES encryption types on their KDCs necessity to subsist mindful not to give GSSAPI services AES keys if the servers believe not been updated. If older GSSAPI services are given AES keys, then services may fail when clients supporting AES for GSSAPI are used. Sites may wish to Use AES for user keys and for the ticket granting ticket key, although doing so requires specifying what encryption types are used as each principal is created.

    If utter GSSAPI-based services believe been updated before or with the KDC, this is not an issue.

    3.2 Salts

    Your Kerberos key is derived from your password. To ensure that people who chance to pick the same password effect not believe the same key, Kerberos 5 incorporates more information into the key using something called a salt. The supported values for salts are as follows.

    normal default for Kerberos Version 5 v4 the only type used by Kerberos Version 4, no salt norealm same as the default, without using realm information onlyrealm uses only realm information as the salt afs3 AFS version 3, only used for compatibility with Kerberos 4 in AFS special only used in very special cases; not fully supported 3.3 krb5.conf

    The krb5.conf file contains Kerberos configuration information, including the locations of KDCs and admin servers for the Kerberos realms of interest, defaults for the current realm and for Kerberos applications, and mappings of hostnames onto Kerberos realms. Normally, you should install your krb5.conf file in the directory /etc. You can override the default location by setting the environment variable KRB5_CONFIG.

    The krb5.conf file is set up in the style of a Windows INI file. Sections are headed by the section name, in square brackets. Each section may hold zero or more relations, of the form:

    foo = bar

    or

    fubar = { foo = bar baz = quux }

    Placing a `*' at the End of a line indicates that this is the final value for the tag. This means that neither the leavings of this configuration file nor any other configuration file will subsist checked for any other values for this tag.

    For example, if you believe the following lines:

    foo = bar* foo = baz

    then the second value of foo (baz) would never subsist read.

    The krb5.conf file may hold any or utter of the following sections:

    libdefaults Contains default values used by the Kerberos V5 library. login Contains default values used by the Kerberos V5 login program. appdefaults Contains default values that can subsist used by Kerberos V5 applications. realms Contains subsections keyed by Kerberos realm names. Each subsection describes realm-specific information, including where to find the Kerberos servers for that realm. domain_realm Contains relations which map domain names and subdomains onto Kerberos realm names. This is used by programs to determine what realm a host should subsist in, given its fully qualified domain name. logging Contains relations which determine how Kerberos programs are to accomplish logging. capaths Contains the authentication paths used with direct (nonhierarchical) cross-realm authentication. Entries in this section are used by the client to determine the intermediate realms which may subsist used in cross-realm authentication. It is furthermore used by the end-service when checking the transited field for trusted intermediate realms. 3.3.1 [libdefaults]

    The libdefaults section may hold any of the following relations:

    default_keytab_name This relation specifies the default keytab appellation to subsist used by application servers such as telnetd and rlogind. The default is /etc/krb5.keytab. default_realm Identifies the default Kerberos realm for the client. Set its value to your Kerberos realm. If this is not specified and the TXT record lookup is enabled (see Using DNS), then that information will subsist used to determine the default realm. If this tag is not set in this configuration file and there is no DNS information found, then an oversight will subsist returned. default_tgs_enctypes Identifies the supported list of session key encryption types that should subsist returned by the KDC. The list may subsist delimited with commas or whitespace. Kerberos supports many different encryption types, and support for more is planned in the future. (see Supported Encryption Types for a list of the accepted values for this tag). The default value is aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 des3-cbc-sha1 arcfour-hmac-md5 des-cbc-crc des-cbc-md5 des-cbc-md4. default_tkt_enctypes Identifies the supported list of session key encryption types that should subsist requested by the client. The format is the same as for default_tgs_enctypes. The default value for this tag is aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 des3-cbc-sha1 arcfour-hmac-md5 des-cbc-crc des-cbc-md5 des-cbc-md4. permitted_enctypes Identifies utter encryption types that are permitted for Use in session key encryption. The default value for this tag is aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 des3-cbc-sha1 arcfour-hmac-md5 des-cbc-crc des-cbc-md5 des-cbc-md4. clockskew Sets the maximum allowable amount of clockskew in seconds that the library will tolerate before assuming that a Kerberos message is invalid. The default value is 300 seconds, or five minutes. kdc_timesync If this is set to 1 (for true), then client machines will compute the inequity between their time and the time returned by the KDC in the timestamps in the tickets and Use this value to revise for an inaccurate system clock. This corrective factor is only used by the Kerberos library. The default is 1. kdc_req_checksum_type ap_req_checksum_type safe_checksum_type An integer which specifies the type of checksum to use. Used for compatability with DCE security servers which effect not support the default RSA MD5 used by this version of Kerberos. The viable values and their meanings are as follows. 1 CRC32 2 RSA MD4 3 RSA MD4 DES 4 DES CBC 7 RSA MD5 8 RSA MD5 DES 9 NIST SHA 12 HMAC SHA1 DES3 -138 Microsoft MD5 HMAC checksum type ccache_type Use this parameter on systems which are DCE clients, to specify the type of cache to subsist created by kinit, or when forwarded tickets are received. DCE and Kerberos can share the cache, but some versions of DCE effect not support the default cache as created by this version of Kerberos. Use a value of 1 on DCE 1.0.3a systems, and a value of 2 on DCE 1.1 systems. The default value is 4. krb4_srvtab Specifies the location of the Kerberos V4 srvtab file. Default is /etc/srvtab. krb4_config Specifies the location of hte Kerberos V4 configuration file. Default is /etc/krb.conf. krb4_realms Specifies the location of the Kerberos V4 domain/realm translation file. Default is /etc/krb.realms. dns_lookup_kdc Indicate whether DNS SRV records should subsist used to locate the KDCs and other servers for a realm, if they are not listed in the information for the realm. (Note that the admin_server entry must subsist in the file, because the DNS implementation for it is incomplete.)

    Enabling this option does open up a type of denial-of-service attack, if someone spoofs the DNS records and redirects you to another server. However, it's no worse than a denial of service, because that fake KDC will subsist unable to decode anything you transmit it (besides the initial ticket request, which has no encrypted data), and anything the fake KDC sends will not subsist trusted without verification using some stealthy that it won't know.

    If this option is not specified but dns_fallback is, that value will subsist used instead. If neither option is specified, the conduct depends on configure-time options; if no share were given, the default is to enable this option. If the DNS support is not compiled in, this entry has no effect.

    dns_lookup_realm Indicate whether DNS TXT records should subsist used to determine the Kerberos realm of a host.

    Enabling this option may permit a redirection attack, where spoofed DNS replies persuade a client to authenticate to the wrong realm, when talking to the wrong host (either by spoofing yet more DNS records or by intercepting the net traffic). Depending on how the client software manages hostnames, however, it could already subsist vulnerable to such attacks. They are looking at viable ways to minimize or liquidate this exposure. For now, they encourage more adventurous sites to try using Secure DNS.

    If this option is not specified but dns_fallback is, that value will subsist used instead. If neither option is specified, the conduct depends on configure-time options; if no share were given, the default is to disable this option. If the DNS support is not compiled in, this entry has no effect.

    dns_fallback General flag controlling the Use of DNS for Kerberos information. If both of the preceding options are specified, this option has no effect. extra_addresses This allows a computer to Use multiple local addresses, in order to allow Kerberos to work in a network that uses NATs. The addresses should subsist in a comma-separated list. udp_preference_limit When sending a message to the KDC, the library will try using TCP before UDP if the size of the message is above udp_preference_list. If the message is smaller than udp_preference_list, then UDP will subsist tried before TCP. Regardless of the size, both protocols will subsist tried if the first attempt fails. verify_ap_req_nofail If this flag is set, then an attempt to obtain initial credentials will fail if the client machine does not believe a keytab. The default for the flag is not set. renew_lifetime The value of this tag is the default renewable lifetime for initial tickets. The default value for the tag is 0. noaddresses Setting this flag causes the initial Kerberos ticket to subsist addressless. The default for the flag is set. forwardable If this flag is set, initial tickets by default will subsist forwardable. The default value for this flag is not set. proxiable If this flag is set, initial tickets by default will subsist proxiable. The default value for this flag is not set. 3.3.2 [appdefaults]

    Each tag in the [appdefaults] section names a Kerberos V5 application or an option that is used by some Kerberos V5 application[s]. The value of the tag defines the default behaviors for that application.

    For example:

    [appdefaults] telnet = { ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { option1 = false } } telnet = { option1 = true option2 = true } ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { option2 = false } option2 = true

    The above four ways of specifying the value of an option are shown in order of decreasing precedence. In this example, if telnet is running in the realm EXAMPLE.COM, it should, by default, believe option1 and option2 set to true. However, a telnet program in the realm ATHENA.MIT.EDU should believe option1 set to inaccurate and option2 set to true. Any other programs in ATHENA.MIT.EDU should believe option2 set to inaccurate by default. Any programs running in other realms should believe option2 set to true.

    The list of specifiable options for each application may subsist establish in that application's man pages. The application defaults specified here are overridden by those specified in the [realms] section.

    A special application appellation (afs_krb5) is used by the krb524 service to know whether unusual format AFS tokens based on Kerberos 5 can subsist used rather than the older format which used a converted Kerberos 4 ticket. The unusual format allows for cross-realm authentication without introducing a security hole. It is used by default. Older AFS servers (before OpenAFS 1.2.8) will not support the unusual format. If servers in your cell effect not support the unusual format, you will necessity to add an afs_krb5 relation to the appdefaults section. The following config file shows how to disable unusual format AFS tickets for the afs.example.com cell in the EXAMPLE.COM realm.

    [appdefaults] afs_krb5 = { EXAMPLE.COM = { afs/afs.example.com = false } } 3.3.3 [login]

    Each tag in the [login] section of the file is an option for login.krb5. This section may hold any of the following relations:

    krb5_get_tickets Indicate whether or not to Use a user's password to obtain V5 tickets. The default value is true. krb4_get_tickets Indicate whether or not to user a user's password to obtain V4 tickets. The default value is false. krb4_convert Indicate whether or not to Use the Kerberos conversion daemon to obtain V4 tickets. The default value is false. If this is set to inaccurate and krb4_get_tickets is true, then login will obtain the V5 tickets directly using the Kerberos V4 protocol directly. This does not currently work with non-MIT-V4 salt types (such as the AFS3 salt type). Note that if this is set to objective and krb524d is not running, login will hang for approximately a minute under Solaris, due to a Solaris socket emulation bug. krb_run_aklog Indicate whether or not to elope aklog. The default value is false. aklog_path Indicate where to find aklog. The default value is $(prefix)/bin/aklog. accept_passwd A objective value will antecedent login not to accept plaintext passwords. The default value is false. This is not yet implemented. 3.3.4 [realms]

    Each tag in the [realms] section of the file is the appellation of a Kerberos realm. The value of the tag is a subsection with relations that define the properties of that particular realm. For each realm, the following tags may subsist specified in the realm's subsection:

    kdc The appellation of a host running a KDC for that realm. An optional port number (separated from the hostname by a colon) may subsist included. For your computer to subsist able to communicate with the KDC for each realm, this tag must subsist given a value in each realm subsection in the configuration file, or there must subsist DNS SRV records specifying the KDCs (see Using DNS). master_kdc Identifies the master KDC(s). Currently, this tag is used in only one case: If an attempt to obtain credentials fails because of an invalid password, the client software will attempt to contact the master KDC, in case the user's password has just been changed, and the updated database has not been propagated to the slave servers yet. (We don't currently check whether the KDC from which the initial response came is on the master KDC list. That may subsist fixed in the future.) database_module This relation indicates the appellation of the configuration section under [dbmodules] for database specific parameters used by the loadable database library. admin_server Identifies the host where the administration server is running. Typically, this is the master Kerberos server. This tag must subsist given a value in order to communicate with the kadmin server for the realm. default_domain This tag is used for Kerberos 4 compatibility. Kerberos 4 does not require the entire hostname of a server to subsist in its principal devotion Kerberos 5 does. This tag provides the domain appellation needed to yield a plenary hostname when translating V4 principal names into V5 principal names. utter servers in this realm are assumed to subsist in the domain given as the value of this tag v4_instance_convert This subsection allows the administrator to configure exceptions to the default_domain mapping rule. It contains V4 instances (the tag name) which should subsist translated to some specific hostname (the tag value) as the second component in a Kerberos V5 principal name. v4_realm This relation is used by the krb524 library routines when converting a V5 principal appellation to a V4 principal name. It is used when the V4 realm appellation and the V5 realm appellation are not the same, but still share the same principal names and passwords. The tag value is the Kerberos V4 realm name. auth_to_local_names This subsection allows you to set definite mappings from principal names to local user names. The tag is the mapping name, and the value is the corresponding local user name. auth_to_local This tag allows you to set a universal rule for mapping principal names to local user names. It will subsist used if there is not an definite mapping for the principal appellation that is being translated. The viable values are: DB:filename The principal will subsist looked up in the database filename. Support for this is not currently compiled in by default. RULE:exp The local appellation will subsist formulated from exp.

    The format for exp is [n:$d..string](regexp)s/pattern/replacement/g. The integer n indicates how many components the target principal should have. If this matches, then a string will subsist formed by putting together the components of the principal in the order indicated by each integer d, and the capricious string string (i.e. if the principal was johndoe/admin then [2:$2$1foo] would result in the string "adminjohndoefoo". If this string matches regexp, then the s//[g] substitution command will subsist elope over the string. The optional g will antecedent the substitution to subsist global over the string, instead of replacing only the first match in the string.

    DEFAULT The principal appellation will subsist used as the local user name. If the principal has more than one component or is not in the default realm, this rule is not applicable and the conversion will fail.

    For example:

    [realms] ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { auth_to_local = { RULE:[2:$1](johndoe)s/^.*$/guest/ RULE:[2:$1;$2](^.*;admin$)s/;admin$// RULE:[2:$2](^.*;root)s/^.*$/root/ DEFAULT } }

    would result in any principal without root or admin as the second component to subsist translated with the default rule. A principal with a second component of admin will become its first component. root will subsist used as the local appellation for any principal with a second component of root. The exception to these two rules are any principals johndoe/*, which will always obtain the local appellation guest.

    3.3.5 [domain_realm]

    The [domain_realm] section provides a translation from a domain appellation or hostname to a Kerberos realm name. The tag appellation can subsist a host name, or a domain name, where domain names are indicated by a prefix of a term (.). The value of the relation is the Kerberos realm appellation for that particular host or domain. Host names and domain names should subsist in lower case.

    If no translation entry applies, the host's realm is considered to subsist the hostname's domain portion converted to upper case. For example, the following [domain_realm] section:

    [domain_realm] .mit.edu = ATHENA.MIT.EDU mit.edu = ATHENA.MIT.EDU crash.mit.edu = TEST.ATHENA.MIT.EDU example.com = EXAMPLE.COM

    maps crash.mit.edu into the TEST.ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm. utter other hosts in the mit.edu domain will map by default to the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm, and utter hosts in the example.com domain will map by default into the EXAMPLE.COM realm. Note the entries for the hosts mit.edu and example.com. Without these entries, these hosts would subsist mapped into the Kerberos realms EDU and ORG, respectively.

    3.3.6 [logging]

    The [logging] section indicates how a particular entity is to accomplish its logging. The relations in this section apportion one or more values to the entity name. Currently, the following entities are used:

    kdc These entries specify how the KDC is to accomplish its logging. admin_server These entries specify how the administrative server is to accomplish its logging. default These entries specify how to accomplish logging in the absence of definite specifications otherwise.

    Values are of the following forms:

    FILE=<filename> FILE:<filename> This value causes the entity's logging messages to retreat to the specified file. If the = configuration is used, the file is overwritten. If the : configuration is used, the file is appended to. STDERR This value causes the entity's logging messages to retreat to its standard oversight stream. CONSOLE This value causes the entity's logging messages to retreat to the console, if the system supports it. DEVICE=<devicename> This causes the entity's logging messages to retreat to the specified device. SYSLOG[:<severity>[:<facility>]] This causes the entity's logging messages to retreat to the system log.

    The severity controversy specifies the default severity of system log messages. This may subsist any of the following severities supported by the syslog(3) call, minus the LOG_ prefix: LOG_EMERG, LOG_ALERT, LOG_CRIT, LOG_ERR, LOG_WARNING, LOG_NOTICE, LOG_INFO, and LOG_DEBUG. For example, a value of CRIT would specify LOG_CRIT severity.

    The facility controversy specifies the facility under which the messages are logged. This may subsist any of the following facilities supported by the syslog(3) summon minus the LOG_ prefix: LOG_KERN, LOG_USER, LOG_MAIL, LOG_DAEMON, LOG_AUTH, LOG_LPR, LOG_NEWS, LOG_UUCP, LOG_CRON, and LOG_LOCAL0 through LOG_LOCAL7.

    If no severity is specified, the default is ERR. If no facility is specified, the default is AUTH.

    In the following example, the logging messages from the KDC will retreat to the console and to the system log under the facility LOG_DAEMON with default severity of LOG_INFO; and the logging messages from the administrative server will subsist appended to the file /var/adm/kadmin.log and sent to the device /dev/tty04.

    [logging] kdc = CONSOLE kdc = SYSLOG:INFO:DAEMON admin_server = FILE:/var/adm/kadmin.log admin_server = DEVICE=/dev/tty04 3.3.7 [capaths]

    In order to accomplish direct (non-hierarchical) cross-realm authentication, a database is needed to construct the authentication paths between the realms. This section defines that database.

    A client will Use this section to find the authentication path between its realm and the realm of the server. The server will Use this section to verify the authentication path used by the client, by checking the transited field of the received ticket.

    There is a tag for each participating realm, and each tag has subtags for each of the realms. The value of the subtags is an intermediate realm which may participate in the cross-realm authentication. The subtags may subsist repeated if there is more then one intermediate realm. A value of "." means that the two realms share keys directly, and no intermediate realms should subsist allowed to participate.

    There are n**2 viable entries in this table, but only those entries which will subsist needed on the client or the server necessity to subsist present. The client needs a tag for its local realm, with subtags for utter the realms of servers it will necessity to authenticate with. A server needs a tag for each realm of the clients it will serve.

    For example, ANL.GOV, PNL.GOV, and NERSC.GOV utter wish to Use the ES.NET realm as an intermediate realm. ANL has a sub realm of TEST.ANL.GOV which will authenticate with NERSC.GOV but not PNL.GOV. The [capaths] section for ANL.GOV systems would peek devotion this:

    [capaths] ANL.GOV = { TEST.ANL.GOV = . PNL.GOV = ES.NET NERSC.GOV = ES.NET ES.NET = . } TEST.ANL.GOV = { ANL.GOV = . } PNL.GOV = { ANL.GOV = ES.NET } NERSC.GOV = { ANL.GOV = ES.NET } ES.NET = { ANL.GOV = . }

    The [capaths] section of the configuration file used on NERSC.GOV systems would peek devotion this:

    [capaths] NERSC.GOV = { ANL.GOV = ES.NET TEST.ANL.GOV = ES.NET TEST.ANL.GOV = ANL.GOV PNL.GOV = ES.NET ES.NET = . } ANL.GOV = { NERSC.GOV = ES.NET } PNL.GOV = { NERSC.GOV = ES.NET } ES.NET = { NERSC.GOV = . } TEST.ANL.GOV = { NERSC.GOV = ANL.GOV NERSC.GOV = ES.NET }

    In the above examples, the ordering is not important, except when the same subtag appellation is used more then once. The client will Use this to determine the path. (It is not vital to the server, since the transited field is not sorted.)

    This feature is not currently supported by DCE. DCE security servers can subsist used with Kerberized clients and servers, but versions prior to DCE 1.1 did not fill in the transited field, and should subsist used with caution.

    3.3.8 [dbdefaults]

    The [dbdefaults] section provides default values for the database specific parameters. It can furthermore specify the configuration section under [dbmodules] section for database specific parameters used by the database library.(see dbmodules).

    The following tags are used in this section:

    database_module This relation indicates the appellation of the configuration section under the [dbmodules] for database specific parameters used by the loadable database library. ldap_kerberos_container_dn This LDAP specific tag indicates the DN of the container protest where the realm objects will subsist located. This value is used if the container protest is not mentioned in the configuration section under [dbmodules]. ldap_kdc_dn This LDAP specific tag indicates the default bind DN for the KDC server. The KDC server does a login to the directory as this object. This protest should believe the rights to read the Kerberos data in the LDAP database. This value is used if the bind DN for the KDC is not mentioned in the configuration section under [dbmodules]. ldap_kadmind_dn This LDAP specific tag indicates the default bind DN for the Administration server. The administration server does a login to the directory as this object. This protest should believe the rights to read and write the Kerberos data in the LDAP database. This value is used if the bind DN for the Administration server is not mentioned in the configuration section under [dbmodules]. ldap_service_password_file This LDAP specific tag indicates the file containing the stashed passwords for the objects used by the Kerberos servers to bind to the LDAP server. This file must subsist kept secure. This value is used if no service password file is mentioned in the configuration section under [dbmodules]. ldap_server This LDAP specific tag indicates the list of LDAP servers that the Kerberos servers can connect to. The list of LDAP servers is whitespace-separated. The LDAP server is specified by a LDAP URI. This value is used if no LDAP servers are mentioned in the configuration section under [dbmodules]. It is recommended to Use the ldapi:// or ldaps:// interface and not to Use ldap:// interface. ldap_conns_per_server This LDAP specific tag indicates the number of connections to subsist maintained per LDAP server. This value is used if the number of connections per LDAP server are not mentioned in the configuration section under [dbmodules]. The default value is 5. 3.3.9 [dbmodules]

    Contains database specific parameters used by the database library. Each tag in the [dbmodules] section of the file names a configuration section for database specific parameters that can subsist referred to by a realm. The value of the tag is a subsection where the relations in that subsection define the database specific parameters.

    For each section, the following tags may subsist specified in the subsection:

    db_library This tag indicates the appellation of the loadable database library. The value should subsist db2 for DB2 database and kldap for LDAP database. ldap_kerberos_container_dn This LDAP specific tag indicates the DN of the container protest where the realm objects will subsist located. ldap_kdc_dn This LDAP specific tag indicates the default bind DN for the KDC server. The KDC server does a login to the directory as this object. This protest should believe the rights to read the Kerberos data in the LDAP database. ldap_kadmind_dn This LDAP specific tag indicates the default bind DN for the Administration server. The administration server does a login to the directory as this object. This protest should believe the rights to read and write the Kerberos data in the LDAP database. ldap_service_password_file This LDAP specific tag indicates the file containing the stashed passwords for the objects used by the Kerberos servers to bind to the LDAP server. This file must subsist kept secure. ldap_server This LDAP specific tag indicates the list of LDAP servers that the Kerberos servers can connect to. The list of LDAP servers is whitespace-separated. The LDAP server is specified by a LDAP URI. It is recommended to Use ldapi:// or ldaps:// interface to connect to the LDAP server. ldap_conns_per_server This LDAP specific tags indicates the number of connections to subsist maintained per LDAP server. 3.3.10 pkinit options

    The following are pkinit-specific options. Note that these values may subsist specified in [libdefaults] as global defaults, or within a realm-specific subsection of [libdefaults], or may subsist specified as realm-specific values in the [realms] section. furthermore note that a realm-specific value over-rides, does not add to, a generic [libdefaults] specification. The search order is:

  • realm-specific subsection of [libdefaults] [libdefaults] EXAMPLE.COM = { pkinit_anchors = FILE:/usr/local/example.com.crt }
  • realm-specific value in the [realms] section, [realms] OTHERREALM.ORG = { pkinit_anchors = FILE:/usr/local/otherrealm.org.crt }
  • generic value in the [libdefaults] section. [libdefaults] pkinit_anchors = DIR:/usr/local/generic_trusted_cas/
  • 3.3.10.1 Specifying pkinit identity information

    The syntax for specifying Public Key identity, trust, and revocation information for pkinit is as follows:

    FILE:file-name[,key-file-name] This option has context-specific behavior. pkinit_identity pkinit_identities file-name specifies the appellation of a PEM-format file containing the user's certificate. If key-file-name is not specified, the user's private key is expected to subsist in file-name as well. Otherwise, key-file-name is the appellation of the file containing the private key. pkinit_anchors pkinit_pool file-name is assumed to subsist the appellation of an OpenSSL-style ca-bundle file. DIR:directory-name This option has context-specific behavior. pkinit_identity pkinit_identities directory-name specifies a directory with files named *.crt and *.key, where the first share of the file appellation is the same for matching pairs of certificate and private key files. When a file with a appellation ending with .crt is found, a matching file ending with .key is assumed to hold the private key. If no such file is found, then the certificate in the .crt is not used. pkinit_anchors pkinit_pool directory-name is assumed to subsist an OpenSSL-style hashed CA directory where each CA cert is stored in a file named hash-of-ca-cert.#. This infrastructure is encouraged, but utter files in the directory will subsist examined and if they hold certificates (in PEM format), they will subsist used. pkinit_revoke directory-name is assumed to subsist an OpenSSL-style hashed CA directory where each revocation list is stored in a file named hash-of-ca-cert.r#. This infrastructure is encouraged, but utter files in the directory will subsist examined and if they hold a revocation list (in PEM format), they will subsist used. PKCS12:pkcs12-file-name pkcs12-file-name is the appellation of a PKCS #12 format file, containing the user's certificate and private key. PKCS11:[module_name=]module-name[:slotid=slot-id][:token=token-label][:certid=cert-id][:certlabel=cert-label] All keyword/values are optional. module-name specifies the location of a library implementing PKCS #11. If a value is encountered with not keyword, it is assumed to subsist the module-name. If no module-name is specified, the default is opensc-pkcs11.so. slotid= and/or token= may subsist specified to force the Use of a particular smard card reader or token if there is more than one available. certid= and/or certlabel= may subsist specified to force the selection of a particular certificate on the device. descry the pkinit_cert_match configuration option for more ways to select a particular certificate to Use for pkinit. ENV:environment-variable-name environment-variable-name specifies the appellation of an environment variable which has been set to a value conforming to one of the previous values. For example, ENV:X509_PROXY, where environment variable X509_PROXY has been set to FILE:/tmp/my_proxy.pem. 3.3.10.2 pkinit krb5.conf options pkinit_identities Specifies the location(s) to subsist used to find the user's X.509 identity information. This option may subsist specified multiple times. Each value is attempted in order until identity information is establish and authentication is attempted. Note that these values are not used if the user specifies X509_user_identity on the command line. pkinit_anchors Specifies the location of trusted anchor (root) certificates which the client trusts to sign KDC certificates. This option may subsist specified multiple times. These values from the config file are not used if the user specifies X509_anchors on the command line. pkinit_pool Specifies the location of intermediate certificates which may subsist used by the client to complete the trust chain between a KDC certificate and a trusted anchor. This option may subsist specified multiple times. pkinit_revoke Specifies the location of Certificate Revocation List (CRL) information to subsist used by the client when verifying the validity of the KDC certificate presented. This option may subsist specified multiple times. pkinit_require_crl_checking The default certificate verification process will always check the available revocation information to descry if a certificate has been revoked. If a match is establish for the certificate in a CRL, verification fails. If the certificate being verified is not listed in a CRL, or there is no CRL present for its issuing CA, and pkinit_require_crl_checking is false, then verification succeeds.

    However, if pkinit_require_crl_checking is objective and there is no CRL information available for the issuing CA, then verification fails.

    pkinit_require_crl_checking should subsist set to objective if the policy is such that up-to-date CRLs must subsist present for every CA.

    pkinit_dh_min_bits Specifies the size of the Diffie-Hellman key the client will attempt to use. The acceptable values are currently 1024, 2048, and 4096. The default is 2048. pkinit_win2k This flag specifies whether the target realm is assumed to support only the old, pre-RFC version of the protocol. The default is false. pkinit_win2k_require_binding If this flag is set to true, it expects that the target KDC is patched to recrudesce a reply with a checksum rather than a nonce. The default is false. pkinit_eku_checking This option specifies what Extended Key Usage value the KDC certificate presented to the client must contain. (Note that if the KDC certificate has the pkinit SubjectAlternativeName encoded as the Kerberos TGS name, EKU checking is not necessary since the issuing CA has certified this as a KDC certificate.) The values recognized in the krb5.conf file are: kpKDC This is the default value and specifies that the KDC must believe the id-pkinit-KPKdc EKU as defined in RFC4556. kpServerAuth If kpServerAuth is specified, a KDC certificate with the id-kp-serverAuth EKU as used by Microsoft will subsist accepted. none If no share is specified, then the KDC certificate will not subsist checked to verify it has an acceptable EKU. The Use of this option is not recommended. pkinit_kdc_hostname The presense of this option indicates that the client is willing to accept a KDC certificate with a dNSName SAN (Subject Alternative Name) rather than requiring the id-pkinit-san as defined in RFC4556. This option may subsist specified multiple times. Its value should hold the acceptable hostname for the KDC (as contained in its certificate). pkinit_cert_match Specifies matching rules that the client certificate must match before it is used to attempt pkinit authentication. If a user has multiple certificates available (on a smart card, or via other media), there must subsist exactly one certificate chosen before attempting pkinit authentication. This option may subsist specified multiple times. utter the available certificates are checked against each rule in order until there is a match of exactly one certificate.

    The Subject and Issuer comparison strings are the RFC2253 string representations from the certificate Subject DN and Issuer DN values.

    The syntax of the matching rules is:

    [relation-operator]component-rule ...

    where

    relation-operator can subsist either &&, sense utter component rules must match, or ||, sense only one component rule must match. The default is && if not specified. component-rule can subsist one of the following. Note that there is no punctuation or whitespace between component rules. <SUBJECT>regular-expression <ISSUER>regular-expression <SAN>regular-expression <EKU>extended-key-usage-list where extended-key-usage-list is a comma-separated list of required Extended Key Usage values. utter values in the list must subsist present in the certificate. pkinit msScLogin clientAuth emailProtection <KU>key-usage-list where key-usage-list is a comma-separated list of required Key Usage values. utter values in the list must subsist present in the certificate. digitalSignature keyEncipherment Examples: pkinit_cert_match = ||<SUBJECT>.*DoE.*<SAN>.*@EXAMPLE.COM pkinit_cert_match = &&<EKU>msScLogin,clientAuth<ISSUER>.*DoE.* pkinit_cert_match = <EKU>msScLogin,clientAuth<KU>digitalSignature 3.3.11 Sample krb5.conf File

    Here is an illustration of a generic krb5.conf file:

    [libdefaults] default_realm = ATHENA.MIT.EDU default_tkt_enctypes = des3-hmac-sha1 des-cbc-crc default_tgs_enctypes = des3-hmac-sha1 des-cbc-crc dns_lookup_kdc = true dns_lookup_realm = false [realms] ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { kdc = kerberos.mit.edu kdc = kerberos-1.mit.edu kdc = kerberos-2.mit.edu:750 admin_server = kerberos.mit.edu master_kdc = kerberos.mit.edu default_domain = mit.edu } EXAMPLE.COM = { kdc = kerberos.example.com kdc = kerberos-1.example.com admin_server = kerberos.example.com } OPENLDAP.MIT.EDU = { kdc = kerberos.mit.edu admin_server = kerberos.mit.edu database_module = openldap_ldapconf } [domain_realm] .mit.edu = ATHENA.MIT.EDU mit.edu = ATHENA.MIT.EDU [capaths] ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { EXAMPLE.COM = . } EXAMPLE.COM = { ATHENA.MIT.EDU = . } [logging] kdc = SYSLOG:INFO admin_server = FILE=/var/kadm5.log [dbdefaults] ldap_kerberos_container_dn = cn=krbcontainer,o=mit [dbmodules] openldap_ldapconf = { db_library = kldap ldap_kerberos_container_dn = cn=krbcontainer,o=mit ldap_kdc_dn = "cn=krbadmin,o=mit" # this protest needs to believe read rights on # the realm container, principal container and realm sub-trees ldap_kadmind_dn = "cn=krbadmin,o=mit" # this protest needs to believe read and write rights on # the realm container, principal container and realm sub-trees ldap_service_password_file = /etc/kerberos/service.keyfile ldap_servers = ldaps://kerberos.mit.edu ldap_conns_per_server = 5 } 3.4 kdc.conf

    The kdc.conf file contains KDC configuration information, including defaults used when issuing Kerberos tickets. Normally, you should install your kdc.conf file in the directory /usr/local/var/krb5kdc. You can override the default location by setting the environment variable KRB5_KDC_PROFILE.

    The kdc.conf file is set up in the same format as the krb5.conf file. (See krb5.conf.) The kdc.conf file may hold any or utter of the following three sections:

    kdcdefaults Contains default values for overall conduct of the KDC. realms Contains subsections keyed by Kerberos realm names. Each subsection describes realm-specific information, including where to find the Kerberos servers for that realm. logging Contains relations which determine how Kerberos programs are to accomplish logging. 3.4.1 [kdcdefaults]

    The following relation is defined in the [kdcdefaults] section:

    kdc_ports This relation lists the ports on which the Kerberos server should listen for UDP requests by default. This list is a comma separated list of integers. If this relation is not specified, the compiled-in default is 88,750, the first being the assigned Kerberos port and the second which was used by Kerberos V4. kdc_tcp_ports This relation lists the ports on which the Kerberos server should listen for TCP connections by default. This list is a comma separated list of integers. If this relation is not specified, the compiled-in default is not to listen for TCP connections at all.

    If you wish to change this (which they effect not recommend, because the current implementation has diminutive protection against denial-of-service attacks), the standard port number assigned for Kerberos TCP traffic is port 88.

    v4_mode This string specifies how the KDC should respond to Kerberos 4 packets. The viable values are none, disable, full, and nopreauth. The default value is none. 3.4.2 [realms]

    Each tag in the [realms] section of the file names a Kerberos realm. The value of the tag is a subsection where the relations in that subsection define KDC parameters for that particular realm.

    For each realm, the following tags may subsist specified in the [realms] subsection:

    acl_file (String.) Location of the access control list (acl) file that kadmin uses to determine which principals are allowed which permissions on the database. The default is /usr/local/var/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl. admin_keytab (String.) Location of the keytab file that the legacy administration daemons kadmind4 and v5passwdd Use to authenticate to the database. The default is /usr/local/var/krb5kdc/kadm5.keytab. database_name (String.) Location of the Kerberos database for this realm. The default is/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/principal. default_principal_expiration (Absolute time string.) Specifies the default expiration date of principals created in this realm. The default value for this tag is 0. default_principal_flags (Flag string.) Specifies the default attributes of principals created in this realm. The format for this string is a comma-separated list of flags, with '+' before each flag that should subsist enabled and '-' before each flag that should subsist disabled. The default is postdateable, forwardable, tgt-based, renewable, proxiable, dup-skey, allow-tickets, and service enabled..

    There are a number of viable flags:

    postdateable Enabling this flag allows the principal to obtain postdateable tickets. forwardable Enabling this flag allows the principal to obtain forwardable tickets. tgt-based Enabling this flag allows a principal to obtain tickets based on a ticket-granting-ticket, rather than repeating the authentication process that was used to obtain the TGT. renewable Enabling this flag allows the principal to obtain renewable tickets. proxiable Enabling this flag allows the principal to obtain proxy tickets. dup-skey Enabling this flag allows the principal to obtain a session key for another user, permitting user-to-user authentication for this principal. allow-tickets Enabling this flag means that the KDC will issue tickets for this principal. Disabling this flag essentially deactivates the principal within this realm. preauth If this flag is enabled on a client principal, then that principal is required to preauthenticate to the KDC before receiving any tickets. On a service principal, enabling this flag means that service tickets for this principal will only subsist issued to clients with a TGT that has the preauthenticated ticket set. hwauth If this flag is enabled, then the principal is required to preauthenticate using a hardware device before receiving any tickets. pwchange Enabling this flag forces a password change for this principal. service Enabling this flag allows the the KDC to issue service tickets for this principal. pwservice If this flag is enabled, it marks this principal as a password change service. This should only subsist used in special cases, for example, if a user's password has expired, then the user has to obtain tickets for that principal without going through the daily password authentication in order to subsist able to change the password. dict_file (String.) Location of the dictionary file containing strings that are not allowed as passwords. If no share is specified or if there is no policy assigned to the principal, no dictionary checks of passwords will subsist performed. kadmind_port (Port number.) Specifies the port on which the kadmind daemon is to listen for this realm. The assigned port for kadmind is 749. kpasswd_port (Port number.) Specifies the port on which the kpasswd daemon is to listen for this realm. The default is 464. key_stash_file (String.) Specifies the location where the master key has been stored (via kdb5_util stash). The default is /usr/local/var/krb5kdc/.k5.REALM, where REALM is the Kerberos realm. kdc_ports (String.) Specifies the list of ports that the KDC is to listen to for UDP requests for this realm. By default, the value of kdc_ports as specified in the [kdcdefaults] section is used. kdc_tcp_ports (String.) Specifies the list of ports that the KDC is to listen to for TCP requests for this realm. By default, the value of kdc_tcp_ports as specified in the [kdcdefaults] section is used. master_key_name (String.) Specifies the appellation of the principal associated with the master key. The default is K/M. master_key_type (Key type string.) Specifies the master key's key type. The default value for this is des3-cbc-sha1. For a list of utter viable values, descry Supported Encryption Types. max_life (Delta time string.) Specifes the maximum time term for which a ticket may subsist valid in this realm. The default value is 10 hours. max_renewable_life (Delta time string.) Specifies the maximum time term during which a valid ticket may subsist renewed in this realm. The default value is 0. supported_enctypes List of key:salt strings. Specifies the default key/salt combinations of principals for this realm. Any principals created through kadmin will believe keys of these types. The default value for this tag is des3-hmac-sha1:normal des-cbc-crc:normal. For lists of viable values, descry Supported Encryption Types and Salts. reject_bad_transit A boolean value (true, false). If set to true, the KDC will check the list of transited realms for cross-realm tickets against the transit path computed from the realm names and the capaths section of its krb5.conf file; if the path in the ticket to subsist issued contains any realms not in the computed path, the ticket will not subsist issued, and an oversight will subsist returned to the client instead. If this value is set to false, such tickets will subsist issued anyways, and it will subsist left up to the application server to validate the realm transit path.

    If the disable-transited-check flag is set in the incoming request, this check is not performed at all. Having the reject_bad_transit option will antecedent such ticket requests to subsist rejected always.

    This transit path checking and config file option currently apply only to TGS requests.

    Earlier versions of the MIT release (before 1.2.3) had bugs in the application server support such that the server-side checks may not subsist performed correctly. They recommend turning this option on, unless you know that utter application servers in this realm believe been updated to fixed versions of the software, and for whatever reason, you don't want the KDC to effect the validation.

    This is a per-realm option so that multiple-realm KDCs may control it separately for each realm, in case (for example) one realm has had the software on its application servers updated but another has not.

    This option defaults to true.

    3.4.3 pkinit options

    The following are pkinit-specific options. Note that these values may subsist specified in [kdcdefaults] as global defaults, or within a realm-specific subsection of [realms]. furthermore note that a realm-specific value over-rides, does not add to, a generic [kdcdefaults] specification. The search order is:

  • realm-specific subsection of [realms] [realms] EXAMPLE.COM = { pkinit_anchors = FILE:/usr/local/example.com.crt }
  • generic value in the [kdcdefaults] section. [kdcdefaults] pkinit_anchors = DIR:/usr/local/generic_trusted_cas/
  • 3.4.3.1 pkinit kdc.conf options

    For information about the syntax of some of these options, descry See pkinit identity syntax.

    pkinit_identity Specifies the location of the KDC's X.509 identity information. This option is required if pkinit is to subsist supported by the KDC. pkinit_anchors Specifies the location of trusted anchor (root) certificates which the KDC trusts to sign client certificates. This option is required if pkinit is to subsist supported by the KDC. This option may subsist specified multiple times. pkinit_pool Specifies the location of intermediate certificates which may subsist used by the KDC to complete the trust chain between a client's certificate and a trusted anchor. This option may subsist specified multiple times. pkinit_revoke Specifies the location of Certificate Revocation List (CRL) information to subsist used by the KDC when verifying the validity of client certificates. This option may subsist specified multiple times. pkinit_require_crl_checking The default certificate verification process will always check the available revocation information to descry if a certificate has been revoked. If a match is establish for the certificate in a CRL, verification fails. If the certificate being verified is not listed in a CRL, or there is no CRL present for its issuing CA, and pkinit_require_crl_checking is false, then verification succeeds.

    However, if pkinit_require_crl_checking is objective and there is no CRL information available for the issuing CA, then verification fails.

    pkinit_require_crl_checking should subsist set to objective if the policy is such that up-to-date CRLs must subsist present for every CA.

    pkinit_dh_min_bits Specifies the minimum number of bits the KDC is willing to accept for a client's Diffie-Hellman key. The default is 2048. pkinit_allow_upn Specifies that the KDC is willing to accept client certificates with the Microsoft UserPrincipalName (UPN) Subject Alternative appellation (SAN). This means the KDC accepts the binding of the UPN in the certificate to the Kerberos principal name.

    The default is false.

    Without this option, the KDC will only accept certificates with the id-pkinit-san as defined in RFC4556. There is currently no option to disable SAN checking in the KDC.

    pkinit_eku_checking This option specifies what Extended Key Usage (EKU) values the KDC is willing to accept in client certificates. The values recognized in the kdc.conf file are: kpClientAuth This is the default value and specifies that client certificates must believe the id-pkinit-KPClientAuth EKU as defined in RFC4556. scLogin If scLogin is specified, client certificates with the Microsoft Smart Card Login EKU (id-ms-kp-sc-logon) will subsist accepted. none If no share is specified, then client certificates will not subsist checked to verify they believe an acceptable EKU. The Use of this option is not recommended. 3.4.4 Sample kdc.conf File

    Here's an illustration of a kdc.conf file:

    [kdcdefaults] kdc_ports = 88 [realms] ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { kadmind_port = 749 max_life = 12h 0m 0s max_renewable_life = 7d 0h 0m 0s master_key_type = des3-hmac-sha1 supported_enctypes = des3-hmac-sha1:normal des-cbc-crc:normal des-cbc-crc:v4 } [logging] kdc = FILE:/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/kdc.log admin_server = FILE:/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/kadmin.log 4 Using DNS 4.1 Mapping Hostnames onto Kerberos Realms

    Mapping hostnames onto Kerberos realms is done in one of two ways.

    The first mechanism, which has been in Use for years in MIT-based Kerberos distributions, works through a set of rules in the krb5.conf configuration file. (See krb5.conf.) You can specify mappings for an entire domain or subdomain, and/or on a hostname-by-hostname basis. Since greater specificity takes precedence, you would effect this by specifying the mappings for a given domain or subdomain and listing the exceptions.

    The second mechanism works by looking up the information in special TXT records in the Domain appellation Service. This is currently not used by default because security holes could result if the DNS TXT records were spoofed. If this mechanism is enabled on the client, it will try to peek up a TXT record for the DNS appellation formed by putting the prefix _kerberos in front of the hostname in question. If that record is not found, it will try using _kerberos and the host's domain name, then its parent domain, and so forth. So for the hostname BOSTON.ENGINEERING.FOOBAR.COM, the names looked up would be:

    _kerberos.boston.engineering.foobar.com _kerberos.engineering.foobar.com _kerberos.foobar.com _kerberos.com

    The value of the first TXT record establish is taken as the realm name. (Obviously, this doesn't work utter that well if a host and a subdomain believe the same name, and different realms. For example, if utter the hosts in the ENGINEERING.FOOBAR.COM domain are in the ENGINEERING.FOOBAR.COM realm, but a host named ENGINEERING.FOOBAR.COM is for some intuition in another realm. In that case, you would set up TXT records for utter hosts, rather than relying on the fallback to the domain name.)

    Even if you effect not choose to Use this mechanism within your site, you may wish to set it up anyway, for Use when interacting with other sites.

    4.2 Hostnames for KDCs

    MIT recommends that your KDCs believe a predefined set of CNAME records (DNS hostname aliases), such as kerberos for the master KDC and kerberos-1, kerberos-2, ... for the slave KDCs. This way, if you necessity to swap a machine, you only necessity to change a DNS entry, rather than having to change hostnames.

    A unusual mechanism for locating KDCs of a realm through DNS has been added to the MIT Kerberos V5 distribution. A relatively unusual record type called SRV has been added to DNS. Looked up by a service appellation and a domain name, these records argue the hostname and port number to contact for that service, optionally with weighting and prioritization. (See RFC 2782 if you want more information. You can ensue the illustration below for straightforward cases.)

    The Use with Kerberos is fairly straightforward. The domain appellation used in the SRV record appellation is the domain-style Kerberos realm name. (It is viable to believe Kerberos realm names that are not DNS-style names, but they don't recommend it for Internet use, and their code does not support it well.) Several different Kerberos-related service names are used:

    _kerberos._udp This is for contacting any KDC by UDP. This entry will subsist used the most often. Normally you should list port 88 on each of your KDCs. _kerberos._tcp This is for contacting any KDC by TCP. The MIT KDC by default will not listen on any TCP ports, so unless you've changed the configuration or you're running another KDC implementation, you should leave this unspecified. If you effect enable TCP support, normally you should Use port 88. _kerberos-master._udp This entry should mention to those KDCs, if any, that will immediately descry password changes to the Kerberos database. This entry is used only in one case, when the user is logging in and the password appears to subsist incorrect; the master KDC is then contacted, and the same password used to try to decrypt the response, in case the user's password had recently been changed and the first KDC contacted hadn't been updated. Only if that fails is an “incorrect password” oversight given.

    If you believe only one KDC, or for whatever intuition there is no accessible KDC that would obtain database changes faster than the others, you effect not necessity to define this entry.

    _kerberos-adm._tcp This should list port 749 on your master KDC. Support for it is not complete at this time, but it will eventually subsist used by the kadmin program and related utilities. For now, you will furthermore necessity the admin_server entry in krb5.conf. (See krb5.conf.) _kpasswd._udp This should list port 464 on your master KDC. It is used when a user changes her password. _kerberos-iv._udp This should mention to your KDCs that serve Kerberos version 4 requests, if you believe Kerberos v4 enabled.

    Be aware, however, that the DNS SRV specification requires that the hostnames listed subsist the canonical names, not aliases. So, for example, you might comprehend the following records in your (BIND-style) zone file:

    $ORIGIN foobar.com. _kerberos TXT "FOOBAR.COM" kerberos CNAME daisy kerberos-1 CNAME use-the-force-luke kerberos-2 CNAME bunny-rabbit _kerberos._udp SRV 0 0 88 daisy SRV 0 0 88 use-the-force-luke SRV 0 0 88 bunny-rabbit _kerberos-master._udp SRV 0 0 88 daisy _kerberos-adm._tcp SRV 0 0 749 daisy _kpasswd._udp SRV 0 0 464 daisy

    As with the DNS-based mechanism for determining the Kerberos realm of a host, they recommend distributing the information this way for Use by other sites that may want to interact with yours using Kerberos, even if you don't immediately invent Use of it within your own site. If you anticipate installing a very big number of machines on which it will subsist difficult to update the Kerberos configuration files, you may wish to effect utter of your Kerberos service lookups via DNS and not build the information (except for admin_server as notable above) in future versions of your krb5.conf files at all. Eventually, they hope to phase out the listing of server hostnames in the client-side configuration files; making preparations now will invent the transition easier in the future.

    5 Administrating the Kerberos Database

    Your Kerberos database contains utter of your realm's Kerberos principals, their passwords, and other administrative information about each principal. For the most part, you will Use the kdb5_util program to manipulate the Kerberos database as a whole, and the kadmin program to invent changes to the entries in the database. (One notable exception is that users will Use the kpasswd program to change their own passwords.) The kadmin program has its own command-line interface, to which you type the database administrating commands.

    Kdb5_util provides a means to create, delete, load, or dump a Kerberos database. It furthermore includes a command to stash a copy of the master database key in a file on a KDC, so that the KDC can authenticate itself to the kadmind and krb5kdc daemons at boot time.

    Kadmin provides for the maintenance of Kerberos principals, KADM5 policies, and service key tables (keytabs). It exists as both a Kerberos client, kadmin, using Kerberos authentication and an RPC, to operate securely from anywhere on the network, and as a local client, kadmin.local, intended to elope directly on the KDC without Kerberos authentication. kadmin.local necessity not elope on the kdc if the database is LDAP. Other than the fact that the remote client uses Kerberos to authenticate the person using it, the functionalities of the two versions are identical. The local version is necessary to enable you to set up enough of the database to subsist able to Use the remote version. It replaces the now obsolete kdb5_edit (except for database dump and load, which are provided by kdb5_util).

    The remote version authenticates to the KADM5 server using the service principal kadmin/admin. If the credentials cache contains a ticket for the kadmin/admin principal, and the -c ccache option is specified, that ticket is used to authenticate to KADM5. Otherwise, the -p and -k options are used to specify the client Kerberos principal appellation used to authenticate. Once kadmin has determined the principal name, it requests a kadmin/admin Kerberos service ticket from the KDC, and uses that service ticket to authenticate to KADM5.

    5.1 Kadmin Options

    You can invoke kadmin or kadmin.local with any of the following options:

    -r REALM Use REALM as the default Kerberos realm for the database. -p principal Use the Kerberos principal principal to authenticate to Kerberos. If this option is not given, kadmin will append admin to either the primary principal name, the environment variable USER, or to the username obtained from getpwuid, in order of preference. -q query Pass query directly to kadmin. This is useful for writing scripts that pass specific queries to kadmin.

    You can invoke kadmin with any of the following options:

    -k [-t keytab] Use the keytab keytab to decrypt the KDC response instead of prompting for a password on the TTY. In this case, the principal will subsist host/hostname. If -t is not used to specify a keytab, then the default keytab will subsist used. -c credentials cache Use credentials_cache as the credentials cache. The credentials cache should hold a service ticket for the kadmin/admin service, which can subsist acquired with the kinit program. If this option is not specified, kadmin requests a unusual service ticket from the KDC, and stores it in its own temporary ccache. -w password Use password as the password instead of prompting for one on the TTY. Note: placing the password for a Kerberos principal with administration access into a shell script can subsist Dangerous if unauthorized users gain read access to the script. -x db_args Specifies the database specific arguments. -x host=<hostname> Specifies the LDAP server to connect to by a LDAP URI. It is recommend to Use ldapi:// or ldaps:// interface to connect to the LDAP server. -x binddn=<bind_dn> Specifies the Distinguished appellation (DN) of the protest used by the administration server to bind to the LDAP server. This protest should believe the read and write rights on the realm container, principal container and realm subtree. -x bindpwd=<bind_password> Specifies the password for the above mentioned binddn. It is recommended not to Use this option. Instead, the password can subsist stashed using the stashsrvpw command of kdb5_ldap_util.

    Note: This database specific controversy is applicable only to kadmin.local and the KADM5 server.

    -s admin_server[:port] Specifies the admin server that kadmin should contact.

    You can invoke kadmin.local with an of the follwing options:

    -d_ dbname Specifies the appellation of the Kerberos database. -e "enctypes ..." Sets the list of cryptosystem and salt types to subsist used for any unusual keys created. descry Supported Encryption Types and Salts for available types. -m Do not authenticate using a keytab. This option will antecedent kadmin to prompt for the master database password. 5.2 Date Format

    Many of the kadmin commands elevate a duration or time as an argument. The date can materialize in a wide variety of formats, such as:

    "15 minutes" "7 days" "1 month" "2 hours" "400000 seconds" "next year" "this Monday" "next Monday" yesterday tomorrow now "second Monday" fortnight "3/31/1992 10:00:07 PST" "January 23, 2007 10:05pm" "22:00 GMT"

    Note that if the date specification contains spaces, you must coop it in double quotes. Note furthermore that you cannot Use a number without a unit. (I.e., “"60 seconds"” is correct, but “60” is incorrect.) utter keywords are case-insensitive. The following is a list of utter of the allowable keywords.

    Months january, jan, february, feb, march, mar, april, apr, may, june, jun, july, jul, august, aug, september, sep, sept, october, oct, november, nov, december, dec Days sunday, sun, monday, mon, tuesday, tues, tue, wednesday, wednes, wed, thursday, thurs, thur, thu, friday, fri, saturday, sat Units year, month, fortnight, week, day, hour, minute, min, second, sec Relative tomorrow, yesterday, today, now, last, this, next, first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, ago Time Zones kadmin recognizes abbreviations for most of the world's time zones. A complete listing appears in kadmin Time Zones. 12-hour Time Delimiters am, pm 5.3 Principals

    Each entry in the Kerberos database contains a Kerberos principal (see Definitions) and the attributes and policies associated with that principal.

    5.3.1 Retrieving Information About a Principal 5.3.1.1 Attributes

    To retrieve a listing of the attributes and/or policies associated with a principal, Use the kadmin get_principal command, which requires the “inquire” administrative privilege. The syntax is:

    get_principal principal

    The get_principal command has the alias getprinc.

    For example, suppose you wanted to view the attributes of the principaljennifer/root@ATHENA.MIT.EDU. You would type:

    shell% kadmin kadmin: getprinc jennifer/root Principal: jennifer/root@ATHENA.MIT.EDU Expiration date: [never] eventual password change: Mon Jan 31 02:06:40 EDT 2002 Password Expiration date: [none] Maximum ticket life: 0 days 10:00:00 Maximum renewable life: 7 days 00:00:00 eventual modified: Wed Jul 24 14:46:25 EDT 2002 (joeadmin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) eventual successful authentication: Mon Jul 29 18:20:17 EDT 2002 eventual failed authentication: Mon Jul 29 18:18:54 EDT 2002 Failed password attempts: 3 Number of keys: 2 Key: vno 2, Triple DES cbc mode with HMAC/sha1, no salt Key: vno 2, DES cbc mode with CRC-32, no salt Attributes: DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE, DISALLOW_PROXIABLE Policy: [none] kadmin:

    The get_principal command has a -terse option, which lists the fields as a quoted, tab-separated string. For example:

    kadmin: getprinc -terse jennifer/root jennifer/root@ATHENA.MIT.EDU 0 1027458564 0 36000 (joeadmin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU 1027536385 18 2 0 [none] 604800 1027980137 1027980054 3 2 1 2 16 0 1 2 1 0 kadmin: 5.3.1.2 Retrieving a List of Principals

    To generate a listing of principals, Use the kadmin list_principals command, which requires the “list” privilege. The syntax is:

    list_principals [expression]

    where expression is a shell-style glob expression that can hold the characters *, ?, [, and ]. utter policy names matching the expression are displayed. The list_principals command has the aliases listprincs, get_principals, and getprincs. For example:

    kadmin: listprincs test* test3@ATHENA.MIT.EDU test2@ATHENA.MIT.EDU test1@ATHENA.MIT.EDU testuser@ATHENA.MIT.EDU kadmin:

    If no expression is provided, utter principals are printed.

    5.3.2 Privileges

    Administrative privileges for the Kerberos database are stored in the file kadm5.acl.

    The format of the file is:

    Kerberos_principal permissions [target_principal] [restrictions]

    The Kerberos principal (and optional target principal) can comprehend the “*” wildcard, so if you want any principal with the instance “admin” to believe plenary permissions on the database, you could Use the principal “*/admin@REALM” where “REALM” is your Kerberos realm. target_principal can furthermore comprehend backreferences to Kerberos_principal, in which "*number" matches the component number in the Kerberos_principal.

    Note: a common Use of an admin instance is so you can accord separate permissions (such as administrator access to the Kerberos database) to a separate Kerberos principal. For example, the user joeadmin might believe a principal for his administrative use, called joeadmin/admin. This way, joeadmin would obtain joeadmin/admin tickets only when he actually needs to Use those permissions.

    The permissions are represented by single letters; UPPER-CASE letters portray negative permissions. The permissions are:

    a allows the addition of principals or policies in the database. A disallows the addition of principals or policies in the database. d allows the deletion of principals or policies in the database. D disallows the deletion of principals or policies in the database. m allows the modification of principals or policies in the database. M disallows the modification of principals or policies in the database. c allows the changing of passwords for principals in the database. C disallows the changing of passwords for principals in the database. i allows inquiries to the database. I disallows inquiries to the database. l allows the listing of principals or policies in the database. L disallows the listing of principals or policies in the database. s allows the definite setting of the key for a principal S disallows the definite setting of the key for a principal * All privileges (admcil). x All privileges (admcil); identical to “*”.

    The restrictions are a string of flags. Allowed restrictions are:

    [+ -]flagname flag is forced to indicated value. The permissible flags are the same as the + and - flags for the kadmin addprinc and modprinc commands. -clearpolicy policy is forced to clear -policy pol policy is forced to subsist pol expire time pwexpire time maxlife time maxrenewlife time associated value will subsist forced to MIN(time, requested value)

    The above flags act as restrictions on any add or modify operation which is allowed due to that ACL line.

    Here is an illustration of a kadm5.acl file. Note that order is important; permissions are determined by the first matching entry.

    */admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU * joeadmin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU ADMCIL joeadmin/*@ATHENA.MIT.EDU il */root@ATHENA.MIT.EDU *@ATHENA.MIT.EDU cil *1/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU */*@ATHENA.MIT.EDU i */admin@EXAMPLE.COM * -maxlife 9h -postdateable

    In the above file, any principal in the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm with an admin instance has utter administrative privileges. The user joeadmin has utter permissions with his admin instance, joeadmin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (matches the first line). He has no permissions at utter with his null instance, joeadmin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (matches the second line). His root instance has inquire and list permissions with any other principal that has the instance root. Any principal in ATHENA.MIT.EDU can inquire, list, or change the password of their admin instance, but not any other admin instance. Any principal in the realm ATHENA.MIT.EDU (except for joeadmin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU, as mentioned above) has inquire privileges. Finally, any principal with an admin instance in EXAMPLE.COM has utter permissions, but any principal that they create or modify will not subsist able to obtain postdateable tickets or tickets with a life of longer than 9 hours.

    5.3.3 Adding or Modifying Principals

    To add a principal to the database, Use the kadmin add_principal command, which requires the “add” administrative privilege. This duty creates the unusual principal, prompting twice for a password, and, if neither the -policy nor -clearpolicy options are specified and the policy “default” exists, assigns it that policy. The syntax is:

    kadmin: add_principal [options] principal

    To modify attributes of a principal, Use the kadmin modify_principal command, which requires the “modify” administrative privilege. The syntax is:

    kadmin: modify_principal [options] principal

    add_principal has the aliases addprinc and ank2. modify_principal has the alias modprinc.

    The add_principal and modify_principal commands elevate the following switches:

    -x db_princ_args Denotes the database specific options. The options for LDAP database are: -x dn=<dn> Specifies the LDAP protest that will hold the Kerberos principal being created. -x linkdn=<dn> Specifies the LDAP protest to which the newly created Kerberos principal protest will point to. -x containerdn=<container_dn> Specifies the container protest under which the Kerberos principal is to subsist created. -x tktpolicy=<policy> Associates a ticket policy to the Kerberos principal. Specifying an vacuous string value clears the ticket policy associated with the principal. Note: * dn and containerdn options are not valid while modifying the principal. * containerdn and linkdn options cannot subsist specified with dn option. * If dn or containerdn options are not specified while adding the principal, the principals are created under the prinicipal container configured in the realm or the realm container. * dn and containerdn should subsist within the subtrees or principal container configured in the realm. -expire date Sets the expiration date of the principal to date. -pwexpire date Sets the expiration date of the password to date. -maxlife maxlife Sets the maximum ticket life of the principal to maxlife. -maxrenewlife maxrenewlife Sets the maximum renewable life of tickets for the principal to maxrenewlife. -kvno number Explicity sets the key version number to number. MIT does not recommend doing this unless there is a specific reason. -policy policy Sets the policy used by this principal. (See Policies.) With modify_principal, the current policy assigned to the principal is set or changed. With add_principal, if this option is not supplied, the -clearpolicy is not specified, and the policy “default” exists, that policy is assigned. If a principal is created with no policy, kadmin will print a warning message. -clearpolicy For modify_principal, removes the current policy from a principal. For add_principal, suppresses the automatic assignment of the policy “default”. {-|+}allow_postdated The “-allow_postdated” option prohibits this principal from obtaining postdated tickets. “+allow_postdated” clears this flag. In effect, “-allow_postdated” sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED flag on the principal in the database. {-|+}allow_forwardable The “-allow_forwardable” option prohibits this principal from obtaining forwardable tickets. “+allow_forwardable” clears this flag. In effect, “-allow_forwardable” sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE flag on the principal in the database. {-|+}allow_renewable The “-allow_renewable” option prohibits this principal from obtaining renewable tickets. “+allow_renewable” clears this flag. In effect, “-allow_renewable” sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE flag on the principal in the database. {-|+}allow_proxiable The “-allow_proxiable” option prohibits this principal from obtaining proxiable tickets. “+allow_proxiable” clears this flag. In effect, “-allow_proxiable” sets theKRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE flag. on the principal in the database. {-|+}allow_dup_skey The “-allow_dup_skey” option disables user-to-user authentication for this principal by prohibiting this principal from obtaining a session key for another user. “+allow_dup_skey” clears this flag. In effect, “-allow_dup_skey” sets theKRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_DUP_SKEY flag on the principal in the database. {-|+}requires_preauth The “+requires_preauth” option requires this principal to preauthenticate before being allowed to kinit. -requires_preauth clears this flag. In effect, +requires_preauth sets the KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH flag on the principal in the database. {-|+}requires_hwauth The “+requires_hwauth” flag requires the principal to preauthenticate using a hardware device before being allowed to kinit. “-requires_hwauth” clears this flag. In effect, “+requires_hwauth” sets the KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_HW_AUTH flag on the principal in the database. {-|+}allow_svr The “-allow_svr” flag prohibits the issuance of service tickets for this principal. “+allow_svr” clears this flag. In effect, “-allow_svr” sets theKRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR flag on the principal in the database. {-|+}allow_tgs_req The “-allow_tgs_req” option specifies that a Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) request for a service ticket for this principal is not permitted. You will probably never necessity to Use this option. “+allow_tgs_req” clears this flag. The default is “+allow_tgs_req”. In effect, “-allow_tgs_req” sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED flag on the principal in the database. {-|+}allow_tix The “-allow_tix” option forbids the issuance of any tickets for this principal. “+allow_tix” clears this flag. The default is “+allow_tix”. In effect, “-allow_tix” sets theKRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX flag on the principal in the database. {-|+}needchange The “+needchange” option sets a flag in attributes field to force a password change; “-needchange” clears it. The default is “-needchange”. In effect, “+needchange” sets the KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE flag on the principal in the database. {-|+}password_changing_service The “+password_changing_service” option sets a flag in the attributes field marking this principal as a password change service. (Again, you will probably never necessity to Use this option.) “-password_changing_service” clears the flag. The default is “-password_changing_service”. In effect, the “+password_changing_service” option sets the KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE flag on the principal in the database. -randkey Sets the key for the principal to a random value (add_principal only). MIT recommends using this option for host keys. -pw password Sets the key of the principal to the specified string and does not prompt for a password (add_principal only). MIT does not recommend using this option. -e enc:salt... Uses the specified list of enctype-salttype pairs for setting the key of the principal. The quotes are necessary if there are multiple enctype-salttype pairs. This will not duty against kadmin daemons earlier than krb5-1.2. descry Supported Encryption Types and Salts for available types.

    If you want to just Use the default values, utter you necessity to effect is:

    kadmin: addprinc jennifer WARNING: no policy specified for "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"; defaulting to no policy. Enter password for principal jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type the password. Re-enter password for principal jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <=Type it again. Principal "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" created. kadmin:

    If you want to create a principal which is contained by a LDAP object, utter you necessity to effect is:

    kadmin: addprinc -x dn=cn=jennifer,o=mit jennifer WARNING: no policy specified for "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"; defaulting to no policy. Enter password for principal jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type the password. Re-enter password for principal jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <=Type it again. Principal "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" created. kadmin:

    If you want to create a principal under a specific LDAP container and link to an existing LDAP object, utter you necessity to effect is:

    kadmin: addprinc -x containerdn=o=mit -x linkdn=cn=david,o=mit david WARNING: no policy specified for "david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"; defaulting to no policy. Enter password for principal david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type the password. Re-enter password for principal david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <=Type it again. Principal "david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" created. kadmin:

    If you want to associate a ticket policy to a principal, utter you necessity to effect is:

    kadmin: modprinc -x tktpolicy=userpolicy david Principal "david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" modified. kadmin:

    If, on the other hand, you want to set up an account that expires on January 1, 2000, that uses a policy called “stduser”, with a temporary password (which you want the user to change immediately), you would type the following. (Note: each line genesis with => is a continuation of the previous line.)

    kadmin: addprinc david -expire "1/1/2000 12:01am EST" -policy stduser => +needchange Enter password for principal david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type the password. Re-enter password for principal david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type it again. Principal "david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" created. kadmin:

    If you will necessity cross-realm authentication, you necessity to add principals for the other realm's TGT to each realm. For example, if you necessity to effect cross-realm authentication between the realms ATHENA.MIT.EDU and EXAMPLE.COM, you would necessity to add the principalskrbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@ATHENA.MIT.EDU and krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@EXAMPLE.COM to both databases. You necessity to subsist sure the passwords and the key version numbers (kvno) are the same in both databases. This may require explicitly setting the kvno with the -kvno option. descry Cross-realm Authentication for more details.

    5.3.4 Deleting Principals

    To delete a principal, Use the kadmin delete_principal command, which requires the “delete” administrative privilege. The syntax is:

    delete_principal [-force] principal

    delete_principal has the alias delprinc. The -force option causes delete_principal not to request if you're sure. For example:

    kadmin: delprinc jennifer Are you sure you want to delete the principal "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"? (yes/no): yes Principal "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" deleted. invent sure that you believe removed this principal from utter ACLs before reusing. kadmin: 5.3.5 Changing Passwords

    To change a principal's password Use the kadmin change_password command, which requires the “modify” administrative privilege (unless the principal is changing his/her own password). The syntax is:

    change_password [options] principal

    The change_password option has the alias cpw. change_password takes the following options:

    -randkey Sets the key of the principal to a random value. -pw password Sets the password to the string password. MIT does not recommend using this option. -e "enc:salt..." Uses the specified list of enctype-salttype pairs for setting the key of the principal. The quotes are necessary if there are multiple enctype-salttype pairs. This will not duty against kadmin daemons earlier than krb5-1.2. descry Supported Encryption Types and Salts for viable values. -keepold Keeps the previous kvno's keys around. There is no easy way to delete the obsolete keys, and this flag is usually not necessary except perhaps for TGS keys. Don't Use this flag unless you know what you're doing. This option is not supported for the LDAP database

    For example:

    kadmin: cpw david Enter password for principal david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type the unusual password. Re-enter password for principal david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type it again. Password for david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU changed. kadmin:

    Note that change_password will not let you change the password to one that is in the principal's password history.

    5.4 Policies

    A policy is a set of rules governing passwords. Policies can prescribe minimum and maximum password lifetimes, minimum number of characters and character classes a password must contain, and the number of obsolete passwords kept in the database.

    5.4.1 Retrieving Policies

    To retrieve a policy, Use the kadmin get_policy command, which requires the “inquire” administrative privilege. The syntax is:

    get_policy [-terse] policy

    The get_policy command has the alias getpol. For example:

    kadmin: get_policy admin Policy: admin Maximum password life: 180 days 00:00:00 Minimum password life: 00:00:00 Minimum password length: 6 Minimum number of password character classes: 2 Number of obsolete keys kept: 5 Reference count: 17 kadmin:

    The reference matter is the number of principals using that policy.

    The get_policy command has a -terse option, which lists each field as a quoted, tab-separated string. For example:

    kadmin: get_policy -terse admin admin 15552000 0 6 2 5 17 kadmin: 5.4.2 Retrieving the List of Policies

    You can retrieve the list of policies with the kadmin list_policies command, which requires the “list” privilege. The syntax is:

    list_policies [expression]

    where expression is a shell-style glob expression that can hold the characters *, ?, and []. utter policy names matching the expression are displayed. The list_policies command has the aliases listpols, get_policies, and getpols. For example:

    kadmin: listpols test-pol dict-only once-a-min test-pol-nopw kadmin: listpols t* test-pol test-pol-nopw kadmin: 5.4.3 Adding or Modifying Policies

    To add a unusual policy, Use the kadmin add_policy command, which requires the “add” administrative privilege. The syntax is:

    add_policy [options] policy_name

    To modify attributes of a principal, Use the kadmin modify_policy command, which requires the “modify” administrative privilege. The syntax is:

    modify_policy [options] policy_name

    add_policy has the alias addpol. modify_poilcy has the alias modpol.

    The add_policy and modify_policy commands elevate the following switches:

    -maxlife time Sets the maximum lifetime of a password to time. -minlife time Sets the minimum lifetime of a password to time. -minlength length Sets the minimum length of a password to length characters. -minclasses number Requires at least number of character classes in a password. -history number Sets the number of past keys kept for a principal to number. This option is not supported for LDAP database.

    Note: The policies are created under realm container in the LDAP database.

    5.4.4 Deleting Policies

    To delete a policy, Use the kadmin delete_policy command, which requires the “delete” administrative privilege. The syntax is:

    delete_policy [-force] policy_name

    The delete_policy command has the alias delpol. It prompts for confirmation before deletion. For example:

    kadmin: delete_policy guests Are you sure you want to delete the policy "guests"? (yes/no): yes kadmin:

    Note that you must cancel the policy from utter principals before deleting it. The delete_policy command will fail if it is in Use by any principals.

    5.5 Global Operations on the Kerberos Database

    The kdb5_util command is the primary tool for administrating the Kerberos database. The syntax is:

    kdb5_util command [kdb5_util_options] [command_options]

    The kdb5_util command takes the following options, which override the defaults specified in the configuration files:

    -r realm specifies the the Kerberos realm of the database. -d database_name specifies the appellation under which the principal database is stored. -k master_key_type specifies the key type of the master key in the database. -M master_key_name specifies the principal appellation of the master key in the database. -m indicates that the master database password should subsist read from the TTY rather than fetched from a file on disk. -sf stash_file specifies the stash file of the master database password -P password specifies the master database password. MIT does not recommend using this option. 5.5.1 Dumping a Kerberos Database to a File

    To dump a Kerberos database into a file, Use the kdb5_util dump command on one of the KDCs. The syntax is:

    kdb5_util dump [-old] [-b6] [-b7] [-ov] [-verbose] [-mkey_convert] [-new_mkey_file] [filename [principals...]]

    The kdb5_util dump command takes the following options:

    -old causes the dump to subsist in the Kerberos 5 Beta 5 and earlier dump format (“kdb5_edit load_dump version 2.0”). -b6 causes the dump to subsist in the Kerberos 5 Beta 6 format (“kdb5_edit load_dump version 3.0”). -b7 causes the dump to subsist in the Kerberos 5 Beta 7 format (“kdbt_edit load_dump version 4”). -ov causes the dump to subsist in ovsec_adm_export format. Currently, the only way to preserve per-principal policy information is to Use this in conjunction with a daily dump. -verbose causes the appellation of each principal and policy to subsist printed as it is dumped. -mkey_convert prompts for a unusual master password, and then dumps the database with utter keys reencrypted in this unusual master key -new_mkey_file reads a unusual key from the default keytab and then dumps the database with utter keys reencrypted in this unusual master key

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_util dump dumpfile shell% shell% kbd5_util dump -verbose dumpfile kadmin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@ATHENA.MIT.EDU kadmin/history@ATHENA.MIT.EDU K/M@ATHENA.MIT.EDU kadmin/changepw@ATHENA.MIT.EDU shell%

    If you specify which principals to dump, you must Use the plenary principal, as in the following example. (The line genesis with => is a continuation of the previous line.):

    shell% kdb5_util dump -verbose dumpfile K/M@ATHENA.MIT.EDU => kadmin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU kadmin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU K/M@ATHENA.MIT.EDU shell%

    Otherwise, the principals will not match those in the database and will not subsist dumped:

    shell% kdb5_util dump -verbose dumpfile K/M kadmin/admin shell%

    If you effect not specify a dump file, kdb5_util will dump the database to the standard output.

    There is currently a bug where the default dump format omits the per-principal policy information. In order to dump utter the data contained in the Kerberos database, you must accomplish a daily dump (with no option flags) and an additional dump using the “-ov” flag to a different file.

    5.5.2 Restoring a Kerberos Database from a Dump File

    To restore a Kerberos database dump from a file, Use the kdb5_util load command on one of the KDCs. The syntax is:

    kdb5_util load [-old] [-b6] [-b7] [-ov] [-verbose] [-update] [-hash] dumpfilename dbname [admin_dbname]

    The kdb5_util load command takes the following options:

    -old requires the dump to subsist in the Kerberos 5 Beta 5 and earlier dump format (“kdb5_edit load_dump version 2.0”). -b6 requires the dump to subsist in the Kerberos 5 Beta 6 format (“kdb5_edit load_dump version 3.0”). -b7 requires the dump to subsist in the Kerberos 5 Beta 7 format (“kdb5_edit load_dump version 4”). -ov requires the dump to subsist in ovsec_adm_export format. -verbose causes the appellation of each principal and policy to subsist printed as it is loaded. -update causes records from the dump file to subsist updated in or added to the existing database. This is useful in conjunction with an ovsec_adm_export format dump if you want to preserve per-principal policy information, since the current default format does not hold this data. -hash causes the database to subsist stored as a hash rather than a binary tree.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_util load dumpfile principal shell% shell% kdb5_util load -update dumpfile principal shell%

    If the database file exists, and the -update flag was not given, kdb5_util will overwrite the existing database.

    5.5.3 Creating a Stash File

    A stash file allows a KDC to authenticate itself to the database utilities, such as kadmin, kadmind, krb5kdc, and kdb5_util.

    To create a stash file, Use the kdb5_util stash command. The syntax is:

    kdb5_util stash [-f keyfile]

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_util stash kdb5_util: Cannot find/read stored master key while reading master key kdb5_util: Warning: proceeding without master key Enter KDC database master key: <= Type the KDC database master password. shell%

    If you effect not specify a stash file, kdb5_util will stash the key in the file specified in your kdc.conf file.

    5.5.4 Creating and Destroying a Kerberos Database

    If you necessity to create a unusual Kerberos database, Use the kdb5_util create command. The syntax is:

    kdb5_util create [-s]

    If you specify the -s option, kdb5_util will stash a copy of the master key in a stash file. (See Creating a Stash File.) For example:

    shell% /usr/local/sbin/kdb5_util -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU create -s kdb5_util: No such file or directory while setting vigorous database to => '/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/principal' Initializing database '/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/principal' for => realm 'ATHENA.MIT.EDU', master key appellation 'K/M@ATHENA.MIT.EDU' You will subsist prompted for the database Master Password. It is vital that you NOT FORGET this password. Enter KDC database master key: <= Type the master password. Re-enter KDC database master key to verify: <= Type it again. shell%

    If you necessity to raze the current Kerberos database, Use the kdb5_util raze command. The syntax is:

    kdb5_util raze [-f]

    The raze command destroys the database, first overwriting the disk sectors and then unlinking the files. If you specify the -f option, kdb5_util will not prompt you for a confirmation before destroying the database.

    shell% /usr/local/sbin/kdb5_util -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU destroy kdb5_util: Deleting KDC database stored in /usr/local/var/krb5kdc/principal, are you sure (type yes to confirm)? <== yes OK, deleting database '/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/principal'... shell% 5.6 Global Operations on the Kerberos LDAP Database

    The kdb5_ldap_util is the primary tool for administrating the Kerberos LDAP database. It allows an administrator to manage realms, Kerberos services ( KDC and Admin Server) and ticket policies. The syntax is:

    kdb5_ldap_util [-D user_dn [-w passwd]] [-H ldap_uri] command [command_options] -D user_dn Specifies the Distinguished appellation (DN) of the user who has sufficient rights to accomplish the operation on the LDAP server. -w passwd Specifies the password of user_dn. This option is not recommended. -H ldap_uri Specifies the URI of the LDAP server. It is recommended to Use ldapi:// or ldaps:// to connect to the LDAP server. 5.6.1 Creating a Kerberos Realm

    If you necessity to create a unusual realm, Use the command as follows:

    create [-r realm] [-subtrees subtree_dn_list] [-sscope search_scope] [-containerref container_reference_dn] [-k mkeytype] [-m|-P password][-sf stashlename] [-s] [-maxtktlife max_ticket_life] [-maxrenewlife max_renewable_ticket_life] [ticket_flags]

    Options to create realm in directory are as follows:

    -r realm Specifies the Kerberos realm of the database; by default the realm returned by krb5_default_local_realm (3) is used. -subtrees subtree_dn_list Specifies the list of subtrees containing principals of a realm. The list contains the DN of the subtree objects separated by colon(:). -sscope search_scope Specifies the scope for searching the principals under the subtree. The viable values are 1 or one (one level), 2 or sub (subtree). -containerref container_reference_dn Specfies the DN of the container protest in which the principals of a realm will subsist created. If the container reference is not configured for a realm, the principals will subsist created in the realm container. -k mkeytype Specifies the key type of the master key in the database; the default is that given in kdc.conf. -m Specifies that the master database password should subsist read from the TTY rather than fetched from a file on disk. -p password Specifies the master database password. This option is not recommended. -sf stashfilename Specifies the stash file of the master database password. -s Specifies that the stash file is to subsist created. -maxtktlife max_ticket_life Specifies maximum ticket life for principals in this realm. This value is used, if it is not set on the principal. -maxrenewlife max_renewable_ticket_life Specifies maximum renewable life of tickets for principals in this realm. This value is used, if it is not set on the principal. ticket_flags Specifies the ticket flags. If this option is not specified, by default, no share of the flags are set. This means utter the ticket options will subsist allowed and no restriction will subsist set. This value is used, if it is not set on the principal. The various flags are: {-|+}allow_postdated -allow_postdated prohibits principals from obtaining postdated tickets. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED flag.).+allow_postdated clears this flag. {-|+}allow_forwardable -allow_forwardable prohibits principals from obtaining forwardable tickets. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE flag.) +allow_forwardable clears this flag. {-|+}allow_renewable -allow_renewable prohibits principals from obtaining renewable tickets. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE flag.) +allow_renewable clears this flag. {-|+}allow_proxiable -allow_proxiable prohibits principals from obtaining proxiable tickets. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXABLE flag.) +allow_proxiable clears this flag. {-|+}allow_dup_skey -allow_dup_skey disables user-to-user authentication for principals by prohibiting principals from obtaining a sessions key for another user. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_DUP_SKEY flag.) +allow_dup_skey clears this flag. {-|+}requires_preauth +requires_preauth requires principals to preauthenticate before being allowed to kinit. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_REQURES_PRE_AUTH flag.) -requires_preauth clears this flag. {-|+}requires_hwauth +requires_hwauth requires principals to preauthenticate using a hardware device before being allowed to kinit. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_REQURES_HW_AUTH flag.) -requires_hwauth clears this flag. {-|+}allow_svr -allow_svr prohibits the issuance of service tickets for principals. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR flag.) +allow_svr clears this flag. {-|+}allow_tgs_req -allow_tgs_req specifies that a Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) request for a service ticket for principals is not permitted. This option is useless for most things.+allow_tgs_req clears this flag. The default is +allow_tgs_req. In effect, -allow_tgs_req sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED flag on principals in the database. {-|+}allow_tix -allow_tix forbids the issuance of any tickets for principals. +allow_tix clears this flag. The default is +allow_tix. In effect, -allow_tix sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX flag on principals in the database. {-|+}needchange +needchange sets a flag in attributes field to force a password change; -needchange clears it. The default is -needchange. In effect, +needchange sets the KRB5_KDB_REQURES_PWCHANGE flag on principals in the database. {-|+}password_changing_service +password_changing_service sets a flag in the attributes field marking principal as a password change service principal (useless for most things). -password_changing_service clears the flag. This flag intentionally has a long name. The default is -password_changing_service. In effect, +password_changing_service sets the KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE flag on principals in the database. shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu create -sscope -subtree ou=users,o=org -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU Password for "cn=admin,o=org": Initializing database for realm 'ATHENA.MIT.EDU' You will subsist prompted for the database Master Password. It is vital that you NOT FORGET this password. Enter KDC database master key: Re-enter KDC database master key to verify: shell% 5.6.1.1 eDirectory Options -kdcdn kdc_servce_list Specifies the list of KDC service objects serving the realm. The list contains the DNs of the KDC service objects separated by colon(:). -admindn admin_service_list Specifies the list of Administration service objects serving the realm. The list contains the DNs of the Administration service objects separated by colon(:). shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu create -sscope -subtree ou=users,o=org -kdcdn cn=krbkdc,o=org -admindn cn=krbadmin,o=org -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU Password for "cn=admin,o=org": Initializing database for realm 'ATHENA.MIT.EDU' You will subsist prompted for the database Master Password. It is vital that you NOT FORGET this password. Enter KDC database master key: Re-enter KDC database master key to verify: shell% 5.6.2 Modifying a Kerberos Realm

    If you necessity to modify a realm, Use the command as follows:

    modify [-r realm] [-subtrees subtree_dn] [-sscope search_scope][-containerref container_reference_dn] [-maxtktlifemax_ticket_life][-maxrenewlife max_renewable_ticket_life] [-ticket_flags]

    Options to modify realm in directory are as follows:

    -r realm Specifies the Kerberos realm of the database; by default the realm returned by krb5_default_local_realm (3) is used. -subtrees subtree_dn_list Specifies the list of subtrees containing principal objects in the realm.The list contains the DN of the subtree objects separated by colon(:). This list replaces the existing list. -sscope search_scope Specifies the scope for searching the principals under the subtrees. The viable values are 1 or one (one level), 2 or sub (subtrees). -containerref container_reference_dn Specifies the Distinguished appellation (DN) of the container protest in which the principals of a realm will subsist created. -maxtktlife max_ticket_life Specifies maximum ticket life for principals in this realm. This value is used, if it is not set on the principal. -maxrenewlife max_renewable_ticket_life Specifies maximum renewable life of tickets for principals in this realm. This value is used, if it is not set on the principal. -ticket_flags Specifies the ticket flags. If this option is not specified, by default, no share of the flags are set. This means utter the ticket options will subsist allowed and no restriction will subsist set. This value is used, if it is not set on the principal. The various flags are: {-|+}allow_postdated -allow_postdated prohibits principals from obtaining postdated tickets. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED flag.).+allow_postdated clears this flag. {-|+}allow_forwardable -allow_forwardable prohibits principals from obtaining forwardable tickets. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE flag.) +allow_forwardable clears this flag. {-|+}allow_renewable -allow_renewable prohibits principals from obtaining renewable tickets. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE flag.) +allow_renewable clears this flag. {-|+}allow_proxiable -allow_proxiable prohibits principals from obtaining proxiable tickets. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXABLE flag.) +allow_proxiable clears this flag. {-|+}allow_dup_skey -allow_dup_skey Disables user-to-user authentication for principals by prohibiting principals from obtaining a sessions key for another user. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_DUP_SKEY flag.). +allow_dup_skey clears This flag. {-|+}requires_preauth +requires_preauth requires principals to preauthenticate before being allowed to kinit. Sets the KRB5_KDB_REQURES_PRE_AUTH flag.-requires_preauth clears this flag. {-|+}requires_hwauth +requires_hwauth requires principals to preauthenticate using a hardware device before being allowed to kinit. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_REQURES_HW_AUTH flag.)-requires_hwauth clears this flag. {-|+}allow_svr -allow_svr prohibits the issuance of service tickets for principals. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR flag.) +allow_svr clears This flag. {-|+}allow_tgs_req -allow_tgs_req specifies that a Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) request for a service ticket for principals is not permitted. This option is useless for most things.+allow_tgs_req clears this flag. The default is. +allow_tgs_req. In effect, -allow_tgs_req sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED flag on principals in the database. {-|+}allow_tix -allow_tix forbids the issuance of any tickets for principals. +allow_tix clears this flag. The default is +allow_tix. In effect, -allow_tix sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX flag on principals in the database. {-|+}needchange +needchange sets a flag in attributes field to force a password change; -needchange clears it. The default is -needchange. In effect,+needchange sets the KRB5_KDB_REQURES_PWCHANGE flag on principals in the database. {-|+}password_changing_service +password_changing_service sets a flag in the attributes field marking principal as a password change service principal (useless for most things).-password_changing_service clears the flag. This flag intentionally has a long name. The default is -password_changing_service In effect, +password_changing_service sets the KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE flag on principals in the database.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu modify -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU +requires_preauth Password for "cn=admin,o=org": shell% 5.6.2.1 eDirectory Options -kdcdn kdc_service_list Specifies the list of KDC service objects serving the realm. The list contains the DNs of the KDC service objects separated by a colon (:). This list replaces the existing list. -clearkdcdn kdc_service_list Specifies the list of KDC service objects that necessity to subsist removed from the existing list. The list contains the DNs of the KDC service objects separated by a colon (:). -addkdcdn kdc_service_list Specifies the list of KDC service objects that necessity to subsist added to the existing list. The list contains the DNs of the KDC service objects separated by a colon (:). -admindn admin_service_list Specifies the list of Administration service objects serving the realm. The list contains the DNs of the Administration service objects separated by a colon (:). This list replaces the existing list. -clearadmindn admin_service_list Specifies the list of Administration service objects that necessity to subsist removed from the existing list. The list contains the DNs of the Administration service objects separated by a colon (:). -addadmindn admin_service_list Specifies the list of Administration service objects that necessity to subsist added to the existing list. The list contains the DNs of the Administration service objects separated by a colon (:). 5.6.3 Retrieving Information about a Kerberos Realm view [-r realm] Displays the attributes of a realm. Option is as follows: -r realm specifies the Kerberos realm of the database; by default the realm returned by krb5_default_local_realm (3)is used.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu view -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU Password for "cn=admin,o=org": Realm Name: ATHENA.MIT.EDU Subtree: ou=users,o=org Subtree: ou=servers,o=org SearchScope: ONE Maximum ticket life: 0 days 01:00:00 Maximum renewable life: 0 days 10:00:00 Ticket flags: DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE shell% 5.6.4 Destroying a Kerberos Realm destroy [-f] [-r realm] Destroys an existing realm. Options are as follows: -f If specified, will not prompt the user for confirmation. -r realm specifies the Kerberos realm of the database; by default the realm returned by krb5_default_local_realm (3)is used.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldap-server1.mit.edu raze -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU Password for "cn=admin,o=org": Deleting KDC database of 'ATHENA.MIT.EDU', are you sure? type 'yes' to confirm)? Yes OK, deleting database of 'ATHENA.MIT.EDU'... shell% 5.6.5 Listing available Kerberos Realms list This option lists the appellation of the realms.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu list Password for "cn=admin,o=org": ATHENA.MIT.EDU OPENLDAP.MIT.EDU MEDIA-LAB.MIT.EDU shell% 5.6.6 Stashing Service Object's Password

    stashsrvpw [-f filename] servicedn

    This command allows an administrator to store the password of service protest in a file. The KDC and Administration server uses this password to authenticate to the LDAP server. Options are as follows:

    -f filename Specifies the complete path of the service password file. By default, /usr/local/var/service_passwd is used. servicedn Specifies the Distinguished appellation (DN) of the service protest whose password is to subsist stored in file.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util stashsrvpw -f /home/andrew/conf_keyle cn=service-kdc,o=org Password for "cn=service-kdc,o=org": Re-enter password for "cn=service-kdc,o=org": shell% 5.6.7 Creating and Modifying a Ticket Policy

    This command creates a ticket policy in directory.

    create_policy [-r realm] [-maxrenewlife max_renewable_ticket_life] [ticket_flags] policy_name

    Ticket policy objects are created under the realm container.

    This command modifies a ticket policy in directory.

    modify_policy [-r realm] [-maxrenewlife max_renewable_ticket_life] [ticket_flags] policy_name

    Options are as follows:

    -r realm Specifies the Kerberos realm of the database; by default the realm returned by krb5_default_local_realm(3) is used. -maxtktlife max_ticket_life specifies maximum ticket life for principals. -maxrenewlife max_renewable_ticket_life specifies maximum renewable life of tickets for principals. ticket_flags Specifies the ticket flags. If this option is not specified, by default, no share of the flags are set. This means utter the ticket options will subsist allowed and no restriction will subsist set.

    The various flags are:

    {-|+}allow_postdated -allow_postdated prohibits principals from obtaining postdated tickets. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED flag.).+allow_postdated clears this flag. {-|+}allow_forwardable -allow_forwardable prohibits principals from obtaining forwardable tickets. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE flag.) +allow_forwardable clears this flag. {-|+}allow_renewable -allow_renewable prohibits principals from obtaining renewable tickets. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE flag.) +allow_renewable clears this flag. {-|+}allow_proxiable -allow_proxiable prohibits principals from obtaining proxiable tickets. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXABLE flag.) +allow_proxiable clears this flag. {-|+}allow_dup_skey -allow_dup_skey Disables user-to-user authentication for principals by prohibiting principals from obtaining a sessions key for another user. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_DUP_SKEY flag.). +allow_dup_skey clears This flag. {-|+}requires_preauth +requires_preauth requires principals to preauthenticate before being allowed to kinit. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_REQURES_PRE_AUTH flag.) -requires_preauth clears this flag. {-|+}requires_hwauth +requires_hwauth requires principals to preauthenticate using a hardware device before being allowed to kinit. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_REQURES_HW_AUTH flag.) -requires_hwauth clears this flag. {-|+}allow_svr -allow_svr prohibits the issuance of service tickets for principals. (Sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR flag.) +allow_svr clears This flag. {-|+}allow_tgs_req -allow_tgs_req specifies that a Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) request for a service ticket for principals is not permitted. This option is useless for most things.+allow_tgs_req clears this flag. The default is +allow_tgs_req. In effect, -allow_tgs_req sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED flag on principals in the database. {-|+}allow_tix -allow_tix forbids the issuance of any tickets for principals. +allow_tix clears this flag. The default is +allow_tix. In effect, -allow_tix sets the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX flag on principals in the database. {-|+}needchange +needchange sets a flag in attributes field to force a password change; -needchange clears it. The default is -needchange. In effect, +needchange sets the KRB5_KDB_REQURES_PWCHANGE flag on principals in the database. {-|+}password_changing_service +password_changing_service sets a flag in the attributes field marking principal as a password change service principal (useless for most things). -password_changing_service clears the flag. This flag intentionally has a long name. The default is -password_changing_service. In effect, +password_changing_service sets the KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE flag on principals in the database. policy_name Specifies the appellation of the ticket policy.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu create_policy -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU -maxtktlife "1 day" -maxrenewlife "1 week" -allow_forwardable usertktpolicy Password for "cn=admin,o=org": shell% 5.6.8 Retrieving Information About a Ticket Policy view_policy [-r realm] policy_name view_policy This option displays the attributes of a ticket policy. Option is as follows: -r realm Specifies the Kerberos realm of the database; by default the realm returned by krb5_default_local_realm(3) is used. policy_name Specifies the appellation of the ticket policy.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu view_policy -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU usertktpolicy Password for "cn=admin,o=org": Ticket policy: usertktpolicy Maxmum ticket life: 0 days 01:00:00 Maxmum renewable life: 0 days 10:00:00 Ticket flags: DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE REQUIRES_PWCHANGE shell% 5.6.9 Destroying a Ticket Policy destroy_policy [-force] [-r realm] policy_name Destroys an existing ticket policy. Options are as follows: -force Forces the deletion of the policy object. If not specified, will subsist prompted for confirmation while deleting the policy. Enter yes to substantiate the deletion. -r realm Specifies the Kerberos realm of the database; by default the realm returned by krb5_default_local_realm(3) is used. policy_name Specifies the appellation of the ticket policy.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu destroy_policy -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU usertktpolicy Password for "cn=admin,o=org": This will delete the policy protest 'usertktpolicy', are you sure? (type 'yes' to confirm)? Yes ** policy protest 'usertktpolicy' deleted. shell% 5.6.10 Listing available Ticket Policies list_policy [-r realm] Lists the appellation of ticket policies in a realm.

    Option are as follows:

    -r realm Specifies the Kerberos realm of the database; by default the realm returned by krb5_default_local_realm(3) is used.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu list_policy -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU Password for "cn=admin,o=org": usertktpolicy tempusertktpolicy krbtktpolicy shell% 5.6.11 Creating a Service protest (eDirectory) create_service -kdc|-admin|-pwd [-servicehost service_host_list] [-realm realm_list] [-randpw| -fileonly] [-filename] service_dn

    Creates a service protest in directory and assigns preempt rights on the container holding kerberos data.

    Options are as follows:

    -kdc Specifies the KDC service -admin Specifies the Administration service -pwd Specifies the Password service -servicehost service_host_list Specifies the list of entries separated by a colon (:). Each entry consists of the hostname or IP address of the server hosting the service, transport protocol and the port number of the service separated by a pound sign (#). For example, server1#tcp#88:server2#udp#89. -realm realm_list Specifies the list of realms that are to subsist associated with this service. The list contains the appellation of the realms separated by a colon (:). -randpw Generates and sets a random password. This option is used to set the random password for the service protest in directory and furthermore to store it in the file. -fileonly option cannot subsist used with -randpw option. -fileonly Stores the password only in a file and not in directory. The -randpw option can not subsist used when -fileonly option is specified. -f filename Specifies the complete path of the file where the service protest password is stashed. If this option is not specified, the default file will subsist /usr/local/var/service_passwd service_dn Specifies the Distinguished appellation (DN) of the Kerberos service to subsist created.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu create_service -kdc -randpw -f /home/andrew/service_passwd cn=service-kdc,o=org Password for "cn=admin,o=org": File does not exist. Creating the file /home/andrew/service_passwd... shell% 5.6.12 Modifying a Service protest (eDirectory) modify_service [-servicehost service_host_list |[-clearservicehost service_host_list] [-addservicehost service_host_list]] [-realm realm_list | [-clearrealm realm_list] [-addrealm realm_list]] service_dn

    Modifies the attributes of a service and assigns preempt rights, if realm associations are changed.

    Options are as follows:

    -servicehost service_host_list List of entries separated by a colon (:) where each entry consists of host appellation or IP address of the server hosting the service, transport protocol, and port number of the service separated by a pound sign (#). This list replaces the existing list. For example, server1#tcp#88:server2#udp#89 -clearservicehost service_host_list Specifies the list of servicehost entries to subsist removed from the existing list. This is a colon separated list. -addservicehost service_host_list Specifies the list of servicehost entries to subsist added to the existing list. This is a colon separated list. -realm realm_list Specifies the list of realms that are to subsist associated with this service. The list contains the appellation of the realms separated by a colon (:). This list replaces the existing list. -clearrealm realm_list Specifies the list of realms to subsist removed from the existing list. The list contains the appellation of the realms separated by a colon (:). -addrealm realm_list Specifies the list of realms to subsist added to the existing list. The list contains the appellation of the realms separated by a colon (:). service_dn Specifies the Distinguished appellation (DN) of the Kerberos service to subsist modified.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu modify_service -realm ATHENA.MIT.EDU cn=service-kdc,o=org Password for "cn=admin,o=org": Changing rights for the service object. please wait ... done shell% 5.6.13 Retrieving Service protest Information (eDirectory) view_service service_dn Displays the attributes of a service. Options are as follows: service_dn Specifies the Distinguished appellation (DN) of the Kerberos service to subsist viewed.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu view_service cn=service-kdc,o=org Password for "cn=admin,o=org": Service dn: cn=service-kdc,o=org Service type: kdc Service host list: Realm DN list: cn=ATHENA.MIT.EDU,cn=Kerberos,o=org shell% 5.6.14 Destroying a Service protest (eDirectory) destroy_service [-force] [-f stashfilename] service_dn

    Destroys an existing service. Options are as follows :

    -force If specified, will not prompt for user's confirmation, instead will force destruction of service. -f stashfilename Complete path of the service password file from where the entry corresponding to the service_dn needs to subsist removed. service_dn Distinguished appellation (DN) of the Kerberos service to subsist destroyed.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu destroy_service cn=service-kdc,o=org Password for "cn=admin,o=org": This will delete the service protest 'cn=service-kdc,o=org', are you sure? (type 'yes' to confirm)? Yes ** service protest 'cn=service-kdc,o=org' deleted. shell% 5.6.15 Listing Available Service Objects (eDirectory) list_service [-basedn base_dn] Lists the appellation of services under a given basis in directory. Options is as follows: -basedn base_dn Specifies the basis DN for searching the policies, limiting the search to a particular subtree. If this option is not provided, LDAP Server specific search basis will subsist used. For e.g., in the case of OpenLDAP, value of defaultsearchbase from slapd.conf file will subsist used, where as in the case of eDirectory, the default value for the basis DN is Root.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu list_service Password for "cn=admin,o=org": cn=service-kdc,o=org cn=service-adm,o=org cn=service-pwd,o=org shell% 5.6.16 Passwords for Service Objects (eDirectory)

    setsrvpw [-randpw|-fileonly][-f filename] service_dn

    Allows an administrator to set password for service objects such as KDC and Administration server in eDirectory and store them in a file. The -fileonly command stores the password in a file and not in the eDirectory object. Options are as follows:

    -randpw Generates and sets a random password on the directory protest and stores it in the file. The -fileonly option can not subsist used if -randpw option is already specified. -fileonly Stores the password only in a file and not in eDirectory. The -randpw option can not subsist used when -fileonly option is specified. -f filename Specifies the complete path of the file where the service protest password is stashed. If this option is not specified, the default file will subsist /usr/local/var/service_passwd. service_dn Specifies the Distinguished appellation (DN) of the service protest whose password is to subsist set.

    For example:

    shell% kdb5_ldap_util setsrvpw -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu setsrvpw -f /home/andrew/conf_keyfile cn=service-kdc,o=org Password for "cn=admin,o=org": Password for "cn=service-kdc,o=org": Re-enter password for "cn=service-kdc,o=org": shell% 5.7 Cross-realm Authentication

    In order for a KDC in one realm to authenticate Kerberos users in a different realm, it must share a key with the KDC in the other realm. In both databases, there must subsist krbtgt service principals for realms. These principals should utter believe the same passwords, key version numbers, and encryption types. For example, if the administrators of ATHENA.MIT.EDU and EXAMPLE.COM wanted to authenticate across the realms, they would elope the following commands on the KDCs in both realms:

    shell%: kadmin.local -e "des3-hmac-sha1:normal des-cbc-crc:v4" kadmin: add_princ -requires_preauth krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@EXAMPLE.COM Enter password for principal krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@EXAMPLE.COM: Re-enter password for principal krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@EXAMPLE.COM: kadmin: add_princ -requires_preauth krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@ATHENA.MIT.EDU Enter password for principal krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: Enter password for principal krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: kadmin:

    Even if most principals in a realm are generally created with the requires_preauth flag enabled, this flag is not desirable on cross-realm authentication keys because doing so makes it impossible to disable preauthentication on a service-by-service basis. Disabling it as in the illustration above is recommended.

    It is furthermore very vital that these principals believe ample passwords. MIT recommends that TGT principal passwords subsist at least 26 characters of random ASCII text.

    5.8 Changing the krbtgt Key

    A Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) is a service ticket for the principal krbtgt/REALM. The key for this principal is created when the Kerberos database is initialized and necessity not subsist changed. However, it will only believe the encryption types supported by the KDC at the time of the initial database creation. To allow Use of newer encryption types for the TGT, this key has to subsist changed.

    Changing this key using the daily kadmin change_password command would invalidate any previously issued TGTs. Therefore, when changing this key, normally one should Use the -keepold flag to change_password to retain the previous key in the database as well as the unusual key. For example:

    kadmin: change_password -randkey -keepold krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@ATHENA.MIT.EDU

    There is currently no way to remove the obsolete key without running change_password without the -keepold flag (and thereby invalidating utter existing TGTs). After issuing this command, the obsolete key is still valid and is still vulnerable to (for instance) beastly force attacks. To completely retire an obsolete key or encryption type, it's therefore currently necessary to declare a flag day, elope change_password without the -keepold flag, and force utter users to acquire unusual tickets.

    6 Configuring Kerberos with OpenLDAP back-end
  • Set up SSL on the OpenLDAP server and client to ensure secure communication when the KDC service and LDAP server are on different machines. ldapi:// can subsist used if the LDAP server and KDC service are running on the same machine.
  • Setting up SSL on the OpenLDAP server:
  • Get a CA certificate using OpenSSL tools
  • Configure OpenLDAP server for using SSL/TLS

    For the latter, you necessity to specify the location of CA certificate location in slapd.conf file.

    Refer to the following link for more information:

    http://www.openldap.org/doc/admin23/tls.html

  • Setting up SSL on OpenLDAP Client:
  • For the KDC and Admin Server, you necessity to effect the client-side configuration in ldap.conf.

    For example,

    TLS_CACERT /etc/openldap/certs/cacert.pem
  • Include the Kerberos schema file (kerberos.schema) in the configuration file (slapd.conf) on the LDAP Server, by providing the location where it is stored. comprehend /etc/openldap/schema/kerberos.schema
  • Configure the LDAP server ACLs to enable the KDC and Admin server to read and write the Kerberos data.

    Sample access control information

    access to dn.base="" by * read access to dn.base="cn=Subschema" by * read access to attrs=userPassword,userPKCS12 by self write by * auth access to attrs=shadowLastChange by self write by * read # Providing access to realm subtree access to dn.subtree= "o=mit" by dn.exact="cn=kdc-service,o=mit" read by dn.exact="cn=adm-service,o=mit" write by * none # Providing access to realm container access to dn.subtree= "cn=MIT.EDU,cn=Kerberos,o=mit" by dn.exact="cn=kdc-service,o=mit" read by dn.exact="cn=adm-service,o=mit" write by * none access to * by * read

    The above list provides the access control information for the KDC and Admin service protest for the realm container and the realm subtree. Thus if the realm subtree or the service objects for a realm are changed then this information should subsist updated.

  • Start the LDAP server as follows: slapd -h "ldapi:/// ldaps:///"
  • Modify the krb5.conf file to comprehend LDAP specific items listed below: realms database_module dbmodules db_library db_module_dir ldap_kdc_dn ldap_kadmind_dn ldap_service_password_file ldap_servers ldap_conns_per_server

    For the sample krb5.conf file, mention to Sample krb5.conf File. For more details, mention to the section krb5.conf

  • Create the realm using kdb5_ldap_util. kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=mit create -subtrees o=mit -r MIT.EDU -s

    Before executing the command, invent sure that the subtree mentioned above (o=mit) exists.

    For more information, mention to the section Global Operations on the Kerberos LDAP Database.

    The realm protest is created under the ldap_kerberos_container_dn specified in the configuration file. This operation will furthermore create the Kerberos container, if not present already. This will subsist used to store information related to utter realms.

  • Stash the password of the service protest used by the KDC and Administration service to bind to the LDAP server using the stashsrvpw command of kdb5_ldap_util. The protest DN should subsist the same as ldap_kdc_dn and ldap_kadmind_dn values specified in the krb5.conf file. kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=mit stashsrvpw -f /etc/kerberos/service.keyfile cn=krbadmin,o=mit
  • Add krb5principalname to the indexes in slapd.conf to speed up the access.
  • 7 Application Servers

    If you necessity to install the Kerberos V5 programs on an application server, please mention to the Kerberos V5 Installation Guide. Once you believe installed the software, you necessity to add that host to the Kerberos database (see Adding or Modifying Principals), and generate a keytab for that host, that contains the host's key. You furthermore necessity to invent sure the host's clock is within your maximum clock skew of the KDCs.

    7.1 Keytabs

    A keytab is a host's copy of its own keylist, which is analogous to a user's password. An application server that needs to authenticate itself to the KDC has to believe a keytab that contains its own principal and key. Just as it is vital for users to protect their passwords, it is equally vital for hosts to protect their keytabs. You should always store keytab files on local disk, and invent them readable only by root, and you should never transmit a keytab file over a network in the clear. Ideally, you should elope the kadmin command to extract a keytab on the host on which the keytab is to reside.

    7.1.1 Adding Principals to Keytabs

    To generate a keytab, or to add a principal to an existing keytab, Use the ktadd command from kadmin, which requires the “inquire” administrative privilege. (If you Use the -glob princ_exp option, it furthermore requires the “list” administrative privilege.) The syntax is:

    ktadd [-k[eytab] keytab] [-q] [-e key:salt_list] [principal | -glob princ_exp] [...]

    The ktadd command takes the following switches:

    -k[eytab] keytab use keytab as the keytab file. Otherwise, ktadd will Use the default keytab file (/etc/krb5.keytab). -e "enc:salt..." Uses the specified list of enctype-salttype pairs for setting the key of the principal. The quotes are necessary if there are multiple enctype-salttype pairs. This will not duty against kadmin daemons earlier than krb5-1.2. descry Supported Encryption Types and Salts for utter viable values. -q run in inaudible mode. This causes ktadd to parade less verbose information. principal | -glob principal expression add principal, or utter principals matching principal expression to the keytab. The rules for principal expression are the same as for the kadmin list_principals (see Retrieving a List of Principals) command.

    Here is a sample session, using configuration files that enable only des-cbc-crc encryption. (The line genesis with => is a continuation of the previous line.)

    kadmin: ktadd host/daffodil.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU kadmin: Entry for principal host/daffodil.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU with kvno 2, encryption type DES-CBC-CRC added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. kadmin: kadmin: ktadd -k /usr/local/var/krb5kdc/kadmind.keytab => kadmin/admin kadmin/changepw kadmin: Entry for principal kadmin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU with kvno 3, encryption type DES-CBC-CRC added to keytab WRFILE:/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/kadmind.keytab. kadmin: 7.1.2 Removing Principals from Keytabs

    To remove a principal from an existing keytab, Use the kadmin ktremove command. The syntax is:

    ktremove [-k[eytab] keytab] [-q] principal [kvno | utter | old]

    The ktremove command takes the following switches:

    -k[eytab] keytab use keytab as the keytab file. Otherwise, ktremove will Use the default keytab file (/etc/krb5.keytab). -q run in inaudible mode. This causes ktremove to parade less verbose information. principal the principal to remove from the keytab. (Required.) kvno remove utter entries for the specified principal whose Key Version Numbers match kvno. all remove utter entries for the specified principal old remove utter entries for the specified principal except those with the highest kvno.

    For example:

    kadmin: ktremove -k /usr/local/var/krb5kdc/kadmind.keytab kadmin/admin kadmin: Entry for principal kadmin/admin with kvno 3 removed from keytab WRFILE:/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/kadmind.keytab. kadmin: 7.2 Clock Skew

    In order to preclude intruders from resetting their system clocks in order to continue to Use expired tickets, Kerberos V5 is set up to reject ticket requests from any host whose clock is not within the specified maximum clock skew of the KDC (as specified in the kdc.conf file). Similarly, hosts are configured to reject responses from any KDC whose clock is not within the specified maximum clock skew of the host (as specified in the krb5.conf file). The default value for maximum clock skew is 300 seconds, or five minutes.

    MIT suggests that you add a line to client machines' /etc/rc files to synchronize the machine's clock to your KDC at boot time. On UNIX hosts, assuming you had a kdc called kerberos in your realm, this would be:

    gettime -s kerberos

    If the host is not likely to subsist rebooted frequently, you may furthermore want to set up a cron job that adjusts the time on a regular basis.

    7.3 Getting DNS Information Correct

    Several aspects of Kerberos reckon on appellation service. In order for Kerberos to provide its tall flush of security, it is less forgiving of appellation service problems than some other parts of your network. It is vital that your Domain appellation System (DNS) entries and your hosts believe the revise information.

    Each host's canonical appellation must subsist the fully-qualified host appellation (including the domain), and each host's IP address must reverse-resolve to the canonical name.

    Other than the localhost entry, invent utter entries in each machine's /etc/hosts file in the following form:

    IP address fully-qualified hostname aliases

    Here is a sample /etc/hosts file:

    # this is a comment 127.0.0.1 localhost localhost@mit.edu 10.0.0.6 daffodil.mit.edu trillium wake-robin

    Additionally, on Solaris machines, you necessity to subsist sure the “hosts” entry in the file/etc/nsswitch.conf includes the source “dns” as well as “file”.

    Finally, each host's keytab file must comprehend a host/key pair for the host's canonical name. You can list the keys in a keytab file by issuing the command klist -k. For example:

    viola# klist -k Keytab name: /etc/krb5.keytab KVNO Principal ---- ------------------------------------------------------------ 1 host/daffodil.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU

    If you telnet to the host with a fresh credentials cache (ticket file), and then klist, the host's service principal should subsist host/fully-qualified-hostname@REALM_NAME.

    7.4 Configuring Your Firewall to Work With Kerberos V5

    If you necessity off-site users to subsist able to obtain Kerberos tickets in your realm, they must subsist able to obtain to your KDC. This requires either that you believe a slave KDC outside your firewall, or you configure your firewall to allow UDP requests into at least one of your KDCs, on whichever port the KDC is running. (The default is port 88; other ports may subsist specified in the KDC's kdc.conf file.) Similarly, if you necessity off-site users to subsist able to change their passwords in your realm, they must subsist able to obtain to your Kerberos admin server. The default port for the admin server is 749.

    If your on-site users inside your firewall will necessity to obtain to KDCs in other realms, you will furthermore necessity to configure your firewall to allow outgoing TCP and UDP requests to port 88. Additionally, if they will necessity to obtain to any Kerberos V4 KDCs, you may furthermore necessity to allow TCP and UDP requests to port 750. If your on-site users inside your firewall will necessity to obtain to Kerberos admin servers in other realms, you will furthermore necessity to allow outgoing TCP and UDP requests to port 749.

    If any of your KDCs are outside your firewall, you will necessity to allow kprop requests to obtain through to the remote KDC. Kprop uses the krb5_prop service on port 754 (tcp).

    If you necessity your off-site users to believe access to machines inside your firewall, you necessity to allow TCP connections from their off-site hosts on the preempt ports for the programs they will subsist using. The following lines from /etc/services parade the default port numbers for the Kerberos V5 programs:

    ftp 21/tcp # Kerberos ftp and telnet Use the telnet 23/tcp # default ports kerberos 88/udp kdc # Kerberos V5 KDC kerberos 88/tcp kdc # Kerberos V5 KDC klogin 543/tcp # Kerberos authenticated rlogin kshell 544/tcp cmd # and remote shell kerberos-adm 749/tcp # Kerberos 5 admin/changepw kerberos-adm 749/udp # Kerberos 5 admin/changepw krb5_prop 754/tcp # Kerberos slave propagation eklogin 2105/tcp # Kerberos auth. & encrypted rlogin krb524 4444/tcp # Kerberos 5 to 4 ticket translator

    By default, Kerberos V5 telnet and ftp Use the same ports as the standard telnet and ftp programs, so if you already allow telnet and ftp connections through your firewall, the Kerberos V5 versions will obtain through as well. If you effect not already allow telnet and ftp connections through your firewall, but necessity your users to subsist able to Use Kerberos V5 telnet and ftp, you can either allow ftp and telnet connections on the standard ports, or switch these programs to non-default port numbers and allow ftp and telnet connections on those ports to obtain through.

    Kerberos V5 rlogin uses the klogin service, which by default uses port 543. Encrypted Kerberos V5 rlogin uses the eklogin service, which by default uses port 2105.

    Kerberos V5 rsh uses the kshell service, which by default uses port 544. However, the server must subsist able to invent a TCP connection from the kshell port to an capricious port on the client, so if your users are to subsist able to Use rsh from outside your firewall, the server they connect to must subsist able to transmit outgoing packets to capricious port numbers. Similarly, if your users necessity to elope rsh from inside your firewall to hosts outside your firewall, the outside server needs to subsist able to connect to an capricious port on the machine inside your firewall. Because Kerberos V5 rcp uses rsh, the same issues apply. If you necessity to Use rsh (or rcp) through your firewall and are concerned with the security implications of allowing connections to capricious ports, MIT suggests that you believe rules that specifically appellation these applications and, if possible, list the allowed hosts.

    The reserve UNIX System Security, by David Curry, is a ample starting point for learning to configure firewalls.

    8 Backups of Secure Hosts

    When you back up a secure host, you should exclude the host's keytab file from the backup. If someone obtained a copy of the keytab from a backup, that person could invent any host masquerade as the host whose keytab was compromised. This could subsist particularly Dangerous if the compromised keytab was from one of your KDCs. If the machine has a disk crash and the keytab file is lost, it is easy to generate another keytab file. (See Adding Principals to Keytabs.) If you are unable to exclude particular files from backups, you should ensure that the backups are kept as secure as the host's root password.

    8.1 Backing Up the Kerberos Database

    As with any file, it is viable that your Kerberos database could become corrupted. If this happens on one of the slave KDCs, you might never notice, since the next automatic propagation of the database would install a fresh copy. However, if it happens to the master KDC, the corrupted database would subsist propagated to utter of the slaves during the next propagation. For this reason, MIT recommends that you back up your Kerberos database regularly. Because the master KDC is continuously dumping the database to a file in order to propagate it to the slave KDCs, it is a simple matter to believe a cron job periodically copy the dump file to a secure machine elsewhere on your network. (Of course, it is vital to invent the host where these backups are stored as secure as your KDCs, and to encrypt its transmission across your network.) Then if your database becomes corrupted, you can load the most recent dump onto the master KDC. (See Restoring a Kerberos Database from a Dump File.)

    9 Bug Reporting

    In any complicated software, there will subsist bugs. If you believe successfully built and installed Kerberos V5, please Use the krb5-send-pr program to fill out a Problem Report should you encounter any errors in their software.

    Bug reports that comprehend proposed fixes are especially welcome. If you effect comprehend fixes, please transmit them using either context diffs or unified diffs (using diff -c or diff -u, respectively). please subsist mindful when using “cut and paste” or other such means to copy a patch into a bug report; depending on the system being used, that can result in converting TAB characters into spaces, which makes applying the patches more difficult.

    The krb5-send-pr program is installed in the directory /usr/local/sbin.

    The krb5-send-pr program enters the problem report into their Problem Report Management System (PRMS), which automatically assigns it to the engineer best able to assist you with problems in the assigned category.

    The krb5-send-pr program will try to intelligently fill in as many fields as it can. You necessity to choose the category, class, severity, and priority of the problem, as well as giving us as much information as you can about its exact nature.

    The PR category will subsist one of:

    krb5-admin krb5-appl krb5-build krb5-clients krb5-doc krb5-kdc krb5-libs krb5-misc pty telnet test

    Choose the category that best describes the district under which your problem falls.

    The class can subsist sw-bug, doc-bug, change-request, or support. The first two are exactly as their names imply. Use change-request when the software is behaving according to specifications, but you want to request changes in some feature or behavior. The support class is intended for more universal questions about building or using Kerberos V5.

    The severity of the problem indicates the problem's impact on the usability of Kerberos V5. If a problem is critical, that means the product, component or concept is completely non-operational, or some essential functionality is missing, and no workaround is known. A serious problem is one in which the product, component or concept is not working properly or significant functionality is missing. Problems that would otherwise subsist considered censorious are rated serious when a workaround is known. A non-critical problem is one that is indeed a problem, but one that is having a minimal effect on your aptitude to Use Kerberos V5. E.g., The product, component or concept is working in general, but lacks features, has irritating behavior, does something wrong, or doesn't match its documentation. The default severity is serious.

    The priority indicates how urgent this particular problem is in relation to your work. Note that low priority does not imply low importance. A priority of tall means a solution is needed as soon as possible. A priority of medium means the problem should subsist solved no later than the next release. A priority of low means the problem should subsist solved in a future release, but it is not vital to your work how soon this happens. The default priority is medium.

    Note that a given severity does not necessarily imply a given priority. For example, a non-critical problem might still believe a tall priority if you are faced with a difficult deadline. Conversely, a serious problem might believe a low priority if the feature it is disabling is one that you effect not need.

    It is vital that you fill in the release field and order us what changes you believe made, if any.

    A sample filled-out configuration from a company named “Toasters, Inc.” might peek devotion this:

    To: krb5-bugs@mit.edu Subject: misspelled "Kerberos" in title of installation guide From: jcb Reply-To: jcb Cc: X-send-pr-version: 3.99 >Submitter-Id: mit >Originator: Jeffrey C. Gilman Bigler >Organization: mit >Confidential: no >Synopsis: Misspelled "Kerberos" in title of installation guide >Severity: non-critical >Priority: low >Category: krb5-doc >Class: doc-bug >Release: 1.0-development >Environment: <machine, os, target, libraries (multiple lines)> System: ULTRIX imbrium 4.2 0 RISC Machine: mips >Description: Misspelled "Kerberos" in title of "Kerboros V5 Installation Guide" >How-To-Repeat: N/A >Fix: revise the spelling.

    If the krb5-send-pr program does not work for you, or if you did not obtain far enough in the process to believe an installed and working krb5-send-pr, you can generate your own form, using the above as an example.

    Appendix A Appendix A.1 Kerberos oversight Messages A.1.1 Kerberos V5 Library oversight Codes

    This is the Kerberos v5 library oversight code table. Protocol oversight codes areERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5 + the protocol oversight code number; other oversight codes start at ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5 + 128.

  • KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE: No error
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP: Client's entry in database has expired
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP: Server's entry in database has expired
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO: Requested protocol version not supported
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO: Client's key is encrypted in an obsolete master key
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO: Server's key is encrypted in an obsolete master key
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN: Client not establish in Kerberos database
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN: Server not establish in Kerberos database
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE: Principal has multiple entries in Kerberos database
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY: Client or server has a null key
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE: Ticket is ineligible for postdating
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID: Requested effectual lifetime is negative or too short
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY: KDC policy rejects request
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION: KDC can't fulfill requested option
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP: KDC has no support for encryption type
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP: KDC has no support for checksum type
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP: KDC has no support for padata type
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP: KDC has no support for transited type
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED: Clients credentials believe been revoked
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED: Credentials for server believe been revoked
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED: TGT has been revoked
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET: Client not yet valid - try again later
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET: Server not yet valid - try again later
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP: Password has expired
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED: Preauthentication failed
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED: Additional pre-authentication required
  • KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH: Requested server and ticket don't match
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_27: KRB5 oversight code 27
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_28: KRB5 oversight code 28
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_29: KRB5 oversight code 29
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_30: KRB5 oversight code 30
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY: Decrypt integrity check failed
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED: Ticket expired
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV: Ticket not yet valid
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT: Request is a replay
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US: The ticket isn't for us
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH: Ticket/authenticator don't match
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW: Clock skew too great
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR: Incorrect net address
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION: Protocol version mismatch
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE: Invalid message type
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED: Message stream modified
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER: Message out of order
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT: Illegal cross-realm ticket
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER: Key version is not available
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY: Service key not available
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL: Mutual authentication failed
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION: Incorrect message direction
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD: Alternative authentication routine required
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ: Incorrect sequence number in message
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM: Inappropriate type of checksum in message
  • KRB5KRB_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED: Policy rejects transited path
  • KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG: Response too ample for UDP, retry with TCP
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_53: KRB5 oversight code 53
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_54: KRB5 oversight code 54
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_55: KRB5 oversight code 55
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_56: KRB5 oversight code 56
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_57: KRB5 oversight code 57
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_58: KRB5 oversight code 58
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_59: KRB5 oversight code 59
  • KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC: Generic oversight (see e-text)
  • KRB5KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG: field is too long for this implementation
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_62: KRB5 oversight code 62
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_63: KRB5 oversight code 63
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_64: KRB5 oversight code 64
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_65: KRB5 oversight code 65
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_66: KRB5 oversight code 66
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_67: KRB5 oversight code 67
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_68: KRB5 oversight code 68
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_69: KRB5 oversight code 69
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_70: KRB5 oversight code 70
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_71: KRB5 oversight code 71
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_72: KRB5 oversight code 72
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_73: KRB5 oversight code 73
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_74: KRB5 oversight code 74
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_75: KRB5 oversight code 75
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_76: KRB5 oversight code 76
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_77: KRB5 oversight code 77
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_78: KRB5 oversight code 78
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_79: KRB5 oversight code 79
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_80: KRB5 oversight code 80
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_81: KRB5 oversight code 81
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_82: KRB5 oversight code 82
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_83: KRB5 oversight code 83
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_84: KRB5 oversight code 84
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_85: KRB5 oversight code 85
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_86: KRB5 oversight code 86
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_87: KRB5 oversight code 87
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_88: KRB5 oversight code 88
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_89: KRB5 oversight code 89
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_90: KRB5 oversight code 90
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_91: KRB5 oversight code 91
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_92: KRB5 oversight code 92
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_93: KRB5 oversight code 93
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_94: KRB5 oversight code 94
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_95: KRB5 oversight code 95
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_96: KRB5 oversight code 96
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_97: KRB5 oversight code 97
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_98: KRB5 oversight code 98
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_99: KRB5 oversight code 99
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_100: KRB5 oversight code 100
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_101: KRB5 oversight code 101
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_102: KRB5 oversight code 102
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_103: KRB5 oversight code 103
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_104: KRB5 oversight code 104
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_105: KRB5 oversight code 105
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_106: KRB5 oversight code 106
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_107: KRB5 oversight code 107
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_108: KRB5 oversight code 108
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_109: KRB5 oversight code 109
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_110: KRB5 oversight code 110
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_111: KRB5 oversight code 111
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_112: KRB5 oversight code 112
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_113: KRB5 oversight code 113
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_114: KRB5 oversight code 114
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_115: KRB5 oversight code 115
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_116: KRB5 oversight code 116
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_117: KRB5 oversight code 117
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_118: KRB5 oversight code 118
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_119: KRB5 oversight code 119
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_120: KRB5 oversight code 120
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_121: KRB5 oversight code 121
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_122: KRB5 oversight code 122
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_123: KRB5 oversight code 123
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_124: KRB5 oversight code 124
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_125: KRB5 oversight code 125
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_126: KRB5 oversight code 126
  • KRB5PLACEHOLD_127: KRB5 oversight code 127
  • KRB5_ERR_RCSID: (RCS Id string for the krb5 oversight table)
  • KRB5_LIBOS_BADLOCKFLAG: Invalid flag for file lock mode
  • KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD: Cannot read password
  • KRB5_LIBOS_BADPWDMATCH: Password mismatch
  • KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR: Password read interrupted
  • KRB5_PARSE_ILLCHAR: Illegal character in component name
  • KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED: Malformed representation of principal
  • KRB5_CONFIG_CANTOPEN: Can't open/find Kerberos configuration file
  • KRB5_CONFIG_BADFORMAT: indecent format of Kerberos configuration file
  • KRB5_CONFIG_NOTENUFSPACE: Insufficient space to recrudesce complete information
  • KRB5_BADMSGTYPE: Invalid message type specified for encoding
  • KRB5_CC_BADNAME: Credential cache appellation malformed
  • KRB5_CC_UNKNOWN_TYPE: Unknown credential cache type
  • KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND: Matching credential not found
  • KRB5_CC_END: End of credential cache reached
  • KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED: Request did not supply a ticket
  • KRB5KRB_AP_WRONG_PRINC: Wrong principal in request
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID: Ticket has invalid flag set
  • KRB5_PRINC_NOMATCH: Requested principal and ticket don't match
  • KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED: KDC reply did not match expectations
  • KRB5_KDCREP_SKEW: Clock skew too Great in KDC reply
  • KRB5_IN_TKT_REALM_MISMATCH: Client/server realm mismatch in initial ticket request
  • KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP: Program lacks support for encryption type
  • KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP: Program lacks support for key type
  • KRB5_WRONG_ETYPE: Requested encryption type not used in message
  • KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP: Program lacks support for checksum type
  • KRB5_REALM_UNKNOWN: Cannot find KDC for requested realm
  • KRB5_SERVICE_UNKNOWN: Kerberos service unknown
  • KRB5_KDC_UNREACH: Cannot contact any KDC for requested realm
  • KRB5_NO_LOCALNAME: No local appellation establish for principal name
  • KRB5_MUTUAL_FAILED: Mutual authentication failed
  • KRB5_RC_TYPE_EXISTS: Replay cache type is already registered
  • KRB5_RC_MALLOC: No more memory to earmark (in replay cache code)
  • KRB5_RC_TYPE_NOTFOUND: Replay cache type is unknown
  • KRB5_RC_UNKNOWN: Generic unknown RC error
  • KRB5_RC_REPLAY: Message is a replay
  • KRB5_RC_IO: Replay I/O operation failed XXX
  • KRB5_RC_NOIO: Replay cache type does not support non-volatile storage
  • KRB5_RC_PARSE: Replay cache appellation parse/format error
  • KRB5_RC_IO_EOF: End-of-file on replay cache I/O
  • KRB5_RC_IO_MALLOC: No more memory to earmark (in replay cache I/O code)
  • KRB5_RC_IO_PERM: license denied in replay cache code
  • KRB5_RC_IO_IO: I/O oversight in replay cache i/o code
  • KRB5_RC_IO_UNKNOWN: Generic unknown RC/IO error
  • KRB5_RC_IO_SPACE: Insufficient system space to store replay information
  • KRB5_TRANS_CANTOPEN: Can't open/find realm translation file
  • KRB5_TRANS_BADFORMAT: indecent format of realm translation file
  • KRB5_LNAME_CANTOPEN: Can't open/find lname translation database
  • KRB5_LNAME_NOTRANS: No translation available for requested principal
  • KRB5_LNAME_BADFORMAT: indecent format of translation database entry
  • KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL: Cryptosystem internal error
  • KRB5_KT_BADNAME: Key table appellation malformed
  • KRB5_KT_UNKNOWN_TYPE: Unknown Key table type
  • KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND: Key table entry not found
  • KRB5_KT_END: End of key table reached
  • KRB5_KT_NOWRITE: Cannot write to specified key table
  • KRB5_KT_IOERR: oversight writing to key table
  • KRB5_NO_TKT_IN_RLM: Cannot find ticket for requested realm
  • KRB5DES_BAD_KEYPAR: DES key has heinous parity
  • KRB5DES_WEAK_KEY: DES key is a weak key
  • KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE: heinous encryption type
  • KRB5_BAD_KEYSIZE: Key size is incompatible with encryption type
  • KRB5_BAD_MSIZE: Message size is incompatible with encryption type
  • KRB5_CC_TYPE_EXISTS: Credentials cache type is already registered.
  • KRB5_KT_TYPE_EXISTS: Key table type is already registered.
  • KRB5_CC_IO: Credentials cache I/O operation failed XXX
  • KRB5_FCC_PERM: Credentials cache file permissions incorrect
  • KRB5_FCC_NOFILE: No credentials cache found
  • KRB5_FCC_INTERNAL: Internal credentials cache error
  • KRB5_CC_WRITE: oversight writing to credentials cache
  • KRB5_CC_NOMEM: No more memory to earmark (in credentials cache code)
  • KRB5_CC_FORMAT: heinous format in credentials cache
  • KRB5_INVALID_FLAGS: Invalid KDC option combination (library internal error) [for dual tgt library calls]
  • KRB5_NO_2ND_TKT: Request missing second ticket [for dual tgt library calls]
  • KRB5_NOCREDS_SUPPLIED: No credentials supplied to library routine
  • KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS: heinous sendauth version was sent
  • KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS: heinous application version was sent (via sendauth)
  • KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADRESPONSE: heinous response (during sendauth exchange)
  • KRB5_SENDAUTH_REJECTED: Server rejected authentication (during sendauth exchange)
  • KRB5_PREAUTH_BAD_TYPE: Unsupported preauthentication type
  • KRB5_PREAUTH_NO_KEY: Required preauthentication key not supplied
  • KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED: Generic preauthentication failure
  • KRB5_RCACHE_BADVNO: Unsupported replay cache format version number
  • KRB5_CCACHE_BADVNO: Unsupported credentials cache format version number
  • KRB5_KEYTAB_BADVNO: Unsupported key table format version number
  • KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP: Program lacks support for address type
  • KRB5_RC_REQUIRED: Message replay detection requires rcache parameter
  • KRB5_ERR_BAD_HOSTNAME: Hostname cannot subsist canonicalized
  • KRB5_ERR_HOST_REALM_UNKNOWN: Cannot determine realm for host
  • KRB5_SNAME_UNSUPP_NAMETYPE: Conversion to service principal undefined for appellation type
  • KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_V4_REPLY: Initial Ticket response appears to subsist Version 4 error
  • KRB5_REALM_CANT_RESOLVE: Cannot resolve KDC for requested realm
  • KRB5_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE: Requesting ticket can't obtain forwardable tickets
  • KRB5_FWD_BAD_PRINCIPAL: heinous principal appellation while trying to forward credentials
  • KRB5_GET_IN_TKT_LOOP: Looping detected inside krb5_get_in_tkt
  • KRB5_CONFIG_NODEFREALM: Configuration file does not specify default realm
  • KRB5_SAM_UNSUPPORTED: heinous SAM flags in obtain_sam_padata
  • KRB5_KT_NAME_TOOLONG: Keytab appellation too long
  • KRB5_KT_KVNONOTFOUND: Key version number for principal in key table is incorrect
  • KRB5_APPL_EXPIRED: This application has expired
  • KRB5_LIB_EXPIRED: This Krb5 library has expired
  • KRB5_CHPW_PWDNULL: unusual password cannot subsist zero length
  • KRB5_CHPW_FAIL: Password change failed
  • KRB5_KT_FORMAT: heinous format in keytab
  • KRB5_NOPERM_ETYPE: Encryption type not permitted
  • KRB5_CONFIG_ETYPE_NOSUPP: No supported encryption types (config file error?)
  • KRB5_OBSOLETE_FN: Program called an obsolete, deleted function
  • KRB5_EAI_FAIL: unknown getaddrinfo failure
  • KRB5_EAI_NODATA: no data available for host/domain name
  • KRB5_EAI_NONAME: host/domain appellation not found
  • KRB5_EAI_SERVICE: service appellation unknown
  • KRB5_ERR_NUMERIC_REALM: Cannot determine realm for numeric host address
  • A.1.2 Kerberos V5 Database Library oversight Codes

    This is the Kerberos v5 database library oversight code table.

  • KRB5_KDB_RCSID: (RCS Id string for the kdb oversight table)
  • KRB5_KDB_INUSE: Entry already exists in database
  • KRB5_KDB_UK_SERROR: Database store error
  • KRB5_KDB_UK_RERROR: Database read error
  • KRB5_KDB_UNAUTH: Insufficient access to accomplish requested operation
  • KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY: No such entry in the database
  • KRB5_KDB_ILL_WILDCARD: Illegal Use of wildcard
  • KRB5_KDB_DB_INUSE: Database is locked or in use–try again later
  • KRB5_KDB_DB_CHANGED: Database was modified during read
  • KRB5_KDB_TRUNCATED_RECORD: Database record is incomplete or corrupted
  • KRB5_KDB_RECURSIVELOCK: Attempt to lock database twice
  • KRB5_KDB_NOTLOCKED: Attempt to unlock database when not locked
  • KRB5_KDB_BADLOCKMODE: Invalid kdb lock mode
  • KRB5_KDB_DBNOTINITED: Database has not been initialized
  • KRB5_KDB_DBINITED: Database has already been initialized
  • KRB5_KDB_ILLDIRECTION: heinous direction for converting keys
  • KRB5_KDB_NOMASTERKEY: Cannot find master key record in database
  • KRB5_KDB_BADMASTERKEY: Master key does not match database
  • KRB5_KDB_INVALIDKEYSIZE: Key size in database is invalid
  • KRB5_KDB_CANTREAD_STORED: Cannot find/read stored master key
  • KRB5_KDB_BADSTORED_MKEY: Stored master key is corrupted
  • KRB5_KDB_CANTLOCK_DB: Insufficient access to lock database
  • KRB5_KDB_DB_CORRUPT: Database format error
  • KRB5_KDB_BAD_VERSION: Unsupported version in database entry
  • KRB5_KDB_BAD_SALTTYPE: Unsupported salt type
  • KRB5_KDB_BAD_ENCTYPE: Unsupported encryption type
  • KRB5_KDB_BAD_CREATEFLAGS: heinous database creation flags
  • KRB5_KDB_NO_PERMITTED_KEY: No matching key in entry having a permitted enc type
  • KRB5_KDB_NO_MATCHING_KEY: No matching key in entry
  • KRB5_KDB_SERVER_INTERNAL_ERR: Server error
  • KRB5_KDB_ACCESS_ERROR: Unable to access Kerberos database
  • KRB5_KDB_INTERNAL_ERROR:Kerberos database internal error
  • KRB5_KDB_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION:Kerberos database constraints violated
  • A.1.3 Kerberos V5 Magic Numbers oversight Codes

    This is the Kerberos v5 magic numbers oversight code table.

  • KV5M_NONE: Kerberos V5 magic number table
  • KV5M_PRINCIPAL: heinous magic number for krb5_principal structure
  • KV5M_DATA: heinous magic number for krb5_data structure
  • KV5M_KEYBLOCK: heinous magic number for krb5_keyblock structure
  • KV5M_CHECKSUM: heinous magic number for krb5_checksum structure
  • KV5M_ENCRYPT_BLOCK: heinous magic number for krb5_encrypt_block structure
  • KV5M_ENC_DATA: heinous magic number for krb5_enc_data structure
  • KV5M_CRYPTOSYSTEM_ENTRY: heinous magic number for krb5_cryptosystem_entry structure
  • KV5M_CS_TABLE_ENTRY: heinous magic number for krb5_cs_table_entry structure
  • KV5M_CHECKSUM_ENTRY: heinous magic number for krb5_checksum_entry structure
  • KV5M_AUTHDATA: heinous magic number for krb5_authdata structure
  • KV5M_TRANSITED: heinous magic number for krb5_transited structure
  • KV5M_ENC_TKT_PART: heinous magic number for krb5_enc_tkt_part structure
  • KV5M_TICKET: heinous magic number for krb5_ticket structure
  • KV5M_AUTHENTICATOR: heinous magic number for krb5_authenticator structure
  • KV5M_TKT_AUTHENT: heinous magic number for krb5_tkt_authent structure
  • KV5M_CREDS: heinous magic number for krb5_creds structure
  • KV5M_LAST_REQ_ENTRY: heinous magic number for krb5_last_req_entry structure
  • KV5M_PA_DATA: heinous magic number for krb5_pa_data structure
  • KV5M_KDC_REQ: heinous magic number for krb5_kdc_req structure
  • KV5M_ENC_KDC_REP_PART: heinous magic number forkrb5_enc_kdc_rep_part structure
  • KV5M_KDC_REP: heinous magic number for krb5_kdc_rep structure
  • KV5M_ERROR: heinous magic number for krb5_error structure
  • KV5M_AP_REQ: heinous magic number for krb5_ap_req structure
  • KV5M_AP_REP: heinous magic number for krb5_ap_rep structure
  • KV5M_AP_REP_ENC_PART: heinous magic number forkrb5_ap_rep_enc_part structure
  • KV5M_RESPONSE: heinous magic number for krb5_response structure
  • KV5M_SAFE: heinous magic number for krb5_safe structure
  • KV5M_PRIV: heinous magic number for krb5_priv structure
  • KV5M_PRIV_ENC_PART: heinous magic number for krb5_priv_enc_part structure
  • KV5M_CRED: heinous magic number for krb5_cred structure
  • KV5M_CRED_INFO: heinous magic number for krb5_cred_info structure
  • KV5M_CRED_ENC_PART: heinous magic number for krb5_cred_enc_part structure
  • KV5M_PWD_DATA: heinous magic number for krb5_pwd_data structure
  • KV5M_ADDRESS: heinous magic number for krb5_address structure
  • KV5M_KEYTAB_ENTRY: heinous magic number for krb5_keytab_entry structure
  • KV5M_CONTEXT: heinous magic number for krb5_context structure
  • KV5M_OS_CONTEXT: heinous magic number for krb5_os_context structure
  • KV5M_ALT_METHOD: heinous magic number for krb5_alt_method structure
  • KV5M_ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY: heinous magic number forkrb5_etype_info_entry structure
  • KV5M_DB_CONTEXT: heinous magic number for krb5_db_context structure
  • KV5M_AUTH_CONTEXT: heinous magic number for krb5_auth_context structure
  • KV5M_KEYTAB: heinous magic number for krb5_keytab structure
  • KV5M_RCACHE: heinous magic number for krb5_rcache structure
  • KV5M_CCACHE: heinous magic number for krb5_ccache structure
  • KV5M_PREAUTH_OPS: heinous magic number for krb5_preauth_ops
  • KV5M_SAM_CHALLENGE: heinous magic number for krb5_sam_challenge
  • KV5M_SAM_KEY: heinous magic number for krb5_sam_key
  • KV5M_ENC_SAM_RESPONSE_ENC: heinous magic number forkrb5_enc_sam_response_enc
  • KV5M_SAM_RESPONSE: heinous magic number for krb5_sam_response
  • KV5M_PREDICTED_SAM_RESPONSE: heinous magic number for krb5_predicted_sam_response
  • KV5M_PASSWD_PHRASE_ELEMENT: heinous magic number for passwd_phrase_element
  • KV5M_GSS_OID: heinous magic number for GSSAPI OID
  • KV5M_GSS_QUEUE: heinous magic number for GSSAPI QUEUE
  • A.1.4 ASN.1 oversight Codes
  • ASN1_BAD_TIMEFORMAT: ASN.1 failed summon to system time library
  • ASN1_MISSING_FIELD: ASN.1 structure is missing a required field
  • ASN1_MISPLACED_FIELD: ASN.1 unexpected field number
  • ASN1_TYPE_MISMATCH: ASN.1 type numbers are inconsistent
  • ASN1_OVERFLOW: ASN.1 value too large
  • ASN1_OVERRUN: ASN.1 encoding ended unexpectedly
  • ASN1_BAD_ID: ASN.1 identifier doesn't match expected value
  • ASN1_BAD_LENGTH: ASN.1 length doesn't match expected value
  • ASN1_BAD_FORMAT: ASN.1 badly-formatted encoding
  • ASN1_PARSE_ERROR: ASN.1 parse error
  • ASN1_BAD_GMTIME: ASN.1 heinous recrudesce from gmtime
  • ASN1_MISMATCH_INDEF: ASN.1 non-constructed indefinite encoding
  • ASN1_MISSING_EOC: ASN.1 missing expected EOC
  • A.1.5 GSSAPI oversight Codes

    Generic GSSAPI Errors:

  • G_BAD_SERVICE_NAME: No in SERVICE-NAME appellation string
  • G_BAD_STRING_UID: STRING-UID-NAME contains nondigits
  • G_NOUSER: UID does not resolve to username
  • G_VALIDATE_FAILED: Validation error
  • G_BUFFER_ALLOC: Couldn't earmark gss_buffer_t data
  • G_BAD_MSG_CTX: Message context invalid
  • G_WRONG_SIZE: Buffer is the wrong size
  • G_BAD_USAGE: Credential usage type is unknown
  • G_UNKNOWN_QOP: Unknown attribute of protection specified
  • G_BAD_HOSTNAME: Hostname in SERVICE-NAME string could not subsist canonicalized
  • G_WRONG_MECH: Mechanism is incorrect
  • G_BAD_TOK_HEADER: Token header is malformed or corrupt
  • G_BAD_DIRECTION: Packet was replayed in wrong direction
  • G_TOK_TRUNC: Token is missing data
  • G_REFLECT: Token was reflected
  • G_WRONG_TOKID: Received token ID does not match expected token ID
  • Kerberos 5 GSSAPI Errors:

  • KG_CCACHE_NOMATCH: Principal in credential cache does not match desired name
  • KG_KEYTAB_NOMATCH: No principal in keytab matches desired name
  • KG_TGT_MISSING: Credential cache has no TGT
  • KG_NO_SUBKEY: Authenticator has no subkey
  • KG_CONTEXT_ESTABLISHED: Context is already fully established
  • KG_BAD_SIGN_TYPE: Unknown signature type in token
  • KG_BAD_LENGTH: Invalid field length in token
  • KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE: Attempt to Use incomplete security context
  • KG_CONTEXT: heinous magic number for krb5_gss_ctx_id_t
  • KG_CRED: heinous magic number for krb5_gss_cred_id_t
  • KG_ENC_DESC: heinous magic number for krb5_gss_enc_desc
  • KG_BAD_SEQ: Sequence number in token is corrupt
  • KG_EMPTY_CCACHE: Credential cache is empty
  • KG_NO_CTYPES: Acceptor and Initiator share no checksum types
  • A.2 kadmin Time Zones

    This is a complete listing of the time zones recognized by the kadmin command.

    gmt Greenwich involve Time ut, utc Universal Time (Coordinated). wet Western European Time. (Same as GMT.) bst British Summer Time. (1 hour ahead of GMT.) wat West Africa Time. (1 hour behind GMT.) at Azores Time. (2 hours behind GMT.) bst Brazil Standard Time. (3 hours behind GMT.) Note that the abbreviation BST furthermore stands for British Summer Time. gst Greenland Standard Time. (3 hours behind GMT.) Note that the abbreviation GST furthermore stands for Guam Standard Time. nft Newfoundland Time. (3.5 hours behind GMT.) nst Newfoundland Standard Time. (3.5 hours behind GMT.) ndt Newfoundland Daylight Time. (2.5 hours behind GMT.) ast Atlantic Standard Time. (4 hours behind GMT.) adt Atlantic Daylight Time. (3 hours behind GMT.) est Eastern Standard Time. (5 hours behind GMT.) edt Eastern Daylight Time. (4 hours behind GMT.) cst Central Standard Time. (6 hours behind GMT.) cdt Central Daylight Time. (5 hours behind GMT.) mst Mountain Standard Time. (7 hours behind GMT.) mdt Mountain Daylight Time. (6 hours behind GMT.) pst Pacific Standard Time. (8 hours behind GMT.) pdt Pacific Daylight Time. (7 hours behind GMT.) yst Yukon Standard Time. (9 hours behind GMT.) ydt Yukon Daylight Time. (8 hours behind GMT.) hst Hawaii Standard Time. (10 hours behind GMT.) hdt Hawaii Daylight Time. (9 hours behind GMT.) cat Central Alaska Time. (10 hours behind GMT.) ahst Alaska-Hawaii Standard Time. (10 hours behind GMT.) nt Nome Time. (11 hours behind GMT.) idlw International Date Line West Time. (12 hours behind GMT.) cet Central European Time. (1 hour ahead of GMT.) met Middle European Time. (1 hour ahead of GMT.) mewt Middle European Winter Time. (1 hour ahead of GMT.) mest Middle European Summer Time. (2 hours ahead of GMT.) swt Swedish Winter Time. (1 hour ahead of GMT.) sst Swedish Summer Time. (1 hours ahead of GMT.) fwt French Winter Time. (1 hour ahead of GMT.) fst French Summer Time. (2 hours ahead of GMT.) eet Eastern Europe Time; Russia Zone 1. (2 hours ahead of GMT.) bt Baghdad Time; Russia Zone 2. (3 hours ahead of GMT.) it Iran Time. (3.5 hours ahead of GMT.) zp4 Russia Zone 3. (4 hours ahead of GMT.) zp5 Russia Zone 4. (5 hours ahead of GMT.) ist Indian Standard Time. (5.5 hours ahead of GMT.) zp6 Russia Zone 5. (6 hours ahead of GMT.) nst North Sumatra Time. (6.5 hours ahead of GMT.) Note that the abbreviation NST is furthermore used for Newfoundland Stanard Time. sst South Sumatra Time; Russia Zone 6. (7 hours ahead of GMT.) Note that SST is furthermore Swedish Summer Time. wast West Australian Standard Time. (7 hours ahead of GMT.) wadt West Australian Daylight Time. (8 hours ahead of GMT.) jt Java Time. (7.5 hours ahead of GMT.) cct China Coast Time; Russia Zone 7. (8 hours ahead of GMT.) jst Japan Standard time; Russia Zone 8. (9 hours ahead of GMT.) kst Korean Standard Time. (9 hours ahead of GMT.) cast Central Australian Standard Time. (9.5 hours ahead of GMT.) cadt Central Australian Daylight Time. (10.5 hours ahead of GMT.) east Eastern Australian Standard Time. (10 hours ahead of GMT.) eadt Eastern Australian Daylight Time. (11 hours ahead of GMT.) gst Guam Standard Time; Russia Zone 9. (10 hours ahead of GMT.) kdt Korean Daylight Time. (10 hours ahead of GMT.) nzt New Zealand Time. (12 hours ahead of GMT.) nzst New Zealand Standard Time. (12 hours ahead of GMT.) nzdt New Zealand Daylight Time. (13 hours ahead of GMT.) idle International Date Line East. (12 hours ahead of GMT.)

    The Upbeat Stats on Statistics | killexams.com true questions and Pass4sure dumps

    My print column examines the recent surge in interest — from students, from universities and from industry — in the field of statistics. More students are studying the field in tall school, receiving degrees from universities and finding employers interested in their skills.

    Google Inc. chief economist Hal Varian helped drive the trend, or at least helped notice it, by referring to the profession as “sexy” in an interview published in Jan. 2009 in McKinsey Quarterly. He was responding to a perception that statisticians could subsist described by the same obsolete line sometimes used to poke fun at economists, namely that they’re people who are ample with numbers, but don’t believe the personalities to subsist accountants. “There’s a diminutive bit of that” about statisticians — “unjustified, in my opinion,” Varian said.



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